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Xenophobia can be defined as the hatred or fear of foreigners or strangers or of their politics or 
culture (Ngwane et al., 2008).  This sentiment reached its tipping point in urban areas across the Republic 
of South Africa in May 2008 when mass, widespread and systematic attacks against African non-
nationals took place across the country.  Although previous research agrees on who played the various 
roles during this crisis event (Everatt, 2010), little research has been carried out to create a predictive 
model to assess where future violence could occur based on a set of conflict indicators.  The purpose of 
this research is to revisit the sociopolitical, geographical and geopolitical landscape of the Republic of 
South Africa during the year preceding the violence of May 2008 to identify the conflict indicators that 
worked towards triggering the violence.  Once these indicators are identified, they will be geospatially 
represented through a series of quantitative thematic maps. 
Findings from this research reveal that there is a positive correlation between conflict indicators 
and large xenophobic events and the importance of this research lies in its ability to serve as the basis for 
a conflict prediction model.  The ability to geospatially represent the conflict indicators that served to 
exacerbate xenophobic tensions across the Republic of South Africa leading up to the violence of May 
2008 can be duplicated today to identify the geographic locations that are most susceptible to experience 


















This thesis is approved for recommendation 













































THESIS DUPLICATION RELEASE 
 




Agreed  ______________________________ 
  Eric Matthew Holder 
 
Refused ______________________________ 




























I would like to thank Dr. Fiona Davidson, Dr. John V. Brahana and Dr. Tom Graff for their guidance, 
direction, assistance, availability and willingness to contribute towards the completion of this research.  
Thanks to Dr. Davidson for completely supporting my research interests, and for investing her expertise 
and resources towards the fruition of this study with the hopes of bringing understanding to an often 
misunderstood region of the world.  
Special thanks are due to the Department of Geosciences at the University of Arkansas for equipping 
me with the required and necessary analytical skillset to accomplish this research, and for creating and 
maintaining an environment of sound academic thought through which my research interests and 
passions were able to take root and grow. 
I would like to thank my parents, who exercised great sacrifice and faith so that I might be able to see 
the world as it should be better seen. 
Lastly, I would like to express endless thanks to the true love of my life.  Your patient endurance and 

















This thesis is broadly dedicated to all men, women and children who have endured the oppression of 































TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES          
 
LIST OF FIGURES          
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS         
 
I. INTRODUCTION         1 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW      3 
 
Pre-1994 Migratory Patterns        3 
Post-1994 Migratory Patterns        6 
a. Inter-Provincial Migration        11 
b. External In-Migration        13 
Conflict Triggers         16 
a. Othering          16 
b. A Perceived Threat         17 
c. Youth Bulges         18 
Group Grievances         22 
a. Xenophobia in the New South Africa       25 
b. The Violence of May        29 
 
III. STUDY SITE          32 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY         38 
 
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS        56 
 
VI. DISCUSSION          91 
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS       94 
 
VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY         97 
 











LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Marital Status          43 
Table 2. Province of Previous Residence        43 
Table 3. Cause of Death from Disease Type        44 
Table 4. Cause of Death by Assault Category        45 
























LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. South Africa‘s Contiguous Neighbors       7 
Figure 2. Mine Labour Employment on the Gold Mines, 1990-2006    9 
Figure 3. Total Border Crossings, 1996-2005       10 
Figure 4. Approved Applications for Permanent Residence, 1990-2005    11 
Figure 5. Western and Eastern Cape        13 
Figure 6. Refugee applications by country of origin, 2006      14 
Figure 7. SAMS Members, 2004         15 
Figure 8. Youth Bulges as a Source of Armed Conflict      20 
Figure 9. The Nine Provinces of the Republic of South Africa     32 
Figure 10. Locations of Xenophobic Violence, January – July 2008    33 
Figure 11. Access to services in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg, 2001   37 
Figure 12. Geographical hierarchy for Community Survey 2007     40 
Figure 13. Creating file geodatabase, Ubuntu       41 
Figure 14. ESRI Hot Spot Analysis (Getis-Ord Gi*) Model     50 
Figure 15. ESRI Spatial Autocorrelation (Morans I) Model     51 
Figure 16. Spatial Autocorrelation Report       52 
Figure 17. Selecting an Appropriate Distance Band      53 
Figure 18. ESRI Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model      54 
Figure 19. Exploratory Regression Model (ERM)       54 
Figure 20. Spatial Distribution of Unemployment Rates by Province, 2007   56 
Figure 21. Spatial Distribution of Unemployment Rates by Municipality, 2007   58 
Figure 22. Hot Spot Analysis of Unemployment Rates, 2007     59 
Figure 23. Spatial Distribution of Women by Population Group per Municipality, 2007  61-62 
Figure 24. Spatial Distribution of Women by Population Group per Province, 2007  63-64 
Figure 25. Spatial Distribution of Singleness in South Africa, 2007    66 
Figure 26. Spatial Distribution of Immigrants Living in South Africa, 2007    67 
 
 
Figure 27. Hot Spot Analysis for Stealing Women Grievance per District Municipality , 2007 68-69 
Figure 28. Spatial Distribution of Spread of Disease Grievance by Province, 2007   71 
Figure 29. Spatial Distribution of Spread of Crime Grievance by Province, 2007            73-75 
Figure 30. Spatial Distribution of Poor Delivery Grievance by Province, 2007   76-77 
Figure 31. Spatial Distribution of Youth Bulge by Province and District Municipality, 2007  78 
Figure 32. Hot Spot Analysis of Youth Bulge by District Municipality, 2007   79 
Figure 33. Spatial Distribution of Poverty per Province, 2007     81-82 
Figure 34. Spatial Distribution of Modified Poverty Rate (MPR) Opportunity, 2007   83 
Figure 35. Hot Spot Analysis of MPR by District Municipality, 2007    84 
Figure 36. Map of OLS Residuals        86 
Figure 37. Spatial Autocorrelation Report of OLS Residuals     88 


















LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 ACMS   African Centre for Migration and Society 
 ANC   African National Congress 
 BEE   Black Economic Empowerment 
 BBBEE   Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
 CPS   Centre for Policy Studies 
 DHS   Department of Home Affairs 
 DMAs   District Management Areas 
 EA   Enumeration Area 
 FSI   The Failed States Index 
 FFP   The Fund for Peace 
 GHS   General Household Survey 
 HRW   Human Rights Watch 
 IDASA   Institute for a Democratic South Africa 
 LFS   Labour Force Survey 
 MDGs   Millennium Development Goals 
 MPI   Modified Poverty Index 
 RDP   Reconstruction and Development Programme 
 RLMS   Regional Labour Market System 
 SAHRC   South African Human Rights Commission 
 SANDF   South African National Defence Force 
 SAPS   South African Police Service 
 SADC   Southern African Development Community 
 SAMP   Southern African Migration Project 
 SAMS   Southern African Migration System 
 STATSSA  Statistics South Africa 
1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Relations between South African nationals and African non-nationals during the post-Apartheid era 
are a striking case of narcissism of minor differences.  Immigrants are sources of fear and anxieties the 
more they are imagined as invisible intruders (Matsinhe, 2011).  At times, differences between the two 
groups can seem impossible to differentiate and often go unnoticed.  Under the correct set of 
circumstances, however, the differences can be perceived as very real and very threatening.  Othering is 
a fundamental process in identity politics within the new South Africa.  The process of othering involves 
the identification of socially constructed markers by which the individual can be distanced from a group.  
The distancing between ―us‖ and ―them‖ has gained increasing attention amongst populations of South 
African nationals and non-nationals through the form of xenophobia.  In the post-Apartheid era of South 
Africa, identity politics and formation is still relatively young.   
Xenophobia is to othering as the chicken is to the egg.  One quite simply cannot exist without the 
other.  Xenophobia amounts to violent harassment of immigrants from other countries in Africa, killing 
―tens, if not thousands‖ (Danso, McDonald 2001).  There exists an exhaustive record supporting the fact 
that migrants have been targeted as ―others‖ and blamed for many social ills (Dodson 2000).  The blame 
is often administered through violent means. 
It took fourteen years from the fall of the Apartheid regime in 1994 for a significant xenophobic event 
to occur.  During the winter of 2008, the process of othering took on the heinous form of coordinated and 
systematic attacks by South African nationals against African non-nationals.  The wave of violence left 
scores of innocent men and women dead, thousands displaced from their homes and millions of rands in 
vandalized, destroyed and looted property and possessions.  The violence was mostly seen in highly 
urbanized cities and surrounding townships, where overcrowding and group grievances were highest.  
The response of the government to the violence was slow at best, and one of widespread denial.  Though 
many researchers and institutions predicted the inevitable violence, those most at risk had very little hope 
for protection, aid relief and relocation placing heavy burden on an already brittle infrastructure.  Prior to 
the May attacks, all evidence pointed towards the inevitability of ―when‖ and not ―if‖ a significant act of 
violence would occur.  Four years later, the inevitability of similar violent civil conflict remains. 
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The objectives of this study are to 1) identify the significant causes of xenophobic conflict as seen in 
the May 2008 attacks, 2) create a series of group grievance and opportunity maps to cartographically 
represent the significant causes of xenophobic conflict, and 3) identify significant spatial relationships 
between the conflict triggers and the number of xenophobic events to serve as the basis of a conflict 
prediction model.  These relationships will serve to answer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Geostatistically representing the primary conflict triggers of the May 2008 xenophobic 
violence is an effective method in measuring the propensity of xenophobic violence in South Africa. 
Xenophobic tensions are as high today as they were prior to the May 2008 attacks.  It is vitally 
important for continued research to be conducted in studying the correlations between significant 




















II.  BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
Pre-1994 Migratory Patterns 
The Afrikaans word for ―separateness‖, apartheid truly was that in every sense.  Apartheid was ―an 
enormously complex, sophisticated, and modern system of racial and economic domination that 
employed the most advanced technology, much of it obtained from the West, to regulate the life and work 
of millions of people‖ (North, 1986).  Prior to 1994, a white minority population governed the Republic of 
South Africa by controlling the geography of the country.  In most part, this was accomplished through 
dividing the country along lines of skin colour by forcibly relocating millions of non-whites from their 
homes and into designated areas deemed appropriate by the white minority rule.   
Apartheid forced nearly four million non-white, non-European persons out of their homes and 
homelands into regulated territories.  Those displaced were located to homelands or ―Bantustans‖.  As 
the central institution of apartheid, the Bantustan system divided South Africans among ten geographic 
territories, which Desmond Tutu, the former Archbishop of Cape Town, called resettlement camps 
(Hawes, 2009).  These homelands were mostly classified by tribal group and successfully allowed the 
white minority rule of South Africa to effectively ―divide and conquer‖ by dividing the non-white majority of 
the population into smaller more controllable groups along lines of subtle differences such as mother 
tongue language, culture and religion.  Non-whites were strictly monitored and their movement controlled.   
Unemployment amongst non-whites was staggeringly high with exception within the mining and 
service industries.  However, as demand for labour increased within these industries, especially the 
mining industry, the demand for cheap, foreign labour also increased.  This demand would be met by the 
far-reaching influx of non-national immigrants from many sub-Saharan African countries.  The movement 
of people before 1994 was very different from the movements of people occurring today.  There was a 
great ease of movement of people under the apartheid regime across permeable or semi-permeable 




 centuries, the 
RLMS was a co-operation between South Africa and the British and Portuguese colonial governments, 
and included many of today‘s Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries.  Its sole 
purpose was to develop a strong work force from neighboring countries to be brought into South Africa to 
4 
 
specifically work in the South African mining industry (Muanamoha, 2010).  The RLMS was so successful 
in fact that throughout the years, South African mines became highly dependent on cheap male migrant 
labour from its neighboring countries.  South African employers systematically recruited foreign migrants 
to supplement what they deemed to be an insufficient supply of cheap domestic labour (Southall, 1994).  
The influx of mostly black African non-nationals into the country served as a significant proportion of the 
work force that fuelled the South African economy.  The apartheid regime readily accepted black migrant 
workers into the country for the sole purpose of procuring valuable minerals from the mines while strictly 
denying the entry of black asylum seekers and refugees.   
In contrast, the apartheid government opened its borders to whites leaving de-colonizing countries 
across the region during the latter part of the twentieth century, often when they did not meet the terms of 
immigration legislation (Peberdy, 2010).  For more than a century, migrants to South Africa consisted 
largely of impoverished rural dwellers from the surrounding peripheries desperately seeking employment 
on almost any terms (Murray, 2003).   
It would become apparent to Africans living in colonies across sub-Saharan Africa that employment 
opportunities were limited in their home countries.  Displaced from their land by their colonizers, many 
migrated south to the mines of South Africa (Jones, 2006) and though asylum seekers and refugees were 
denied legal entry into the country, the South African government could do little to deter the illegal 
movement of peoples across borders.  In fact, illegal immigration was subtly encouraged for years 
(Muanamoha, 2010).  This deliberate choice to look the other way in regards to illegal immigration did at 
times have undesirable consequences.  Such a rapid influx of immigrants over a relatively short amount 
of time caused the apartheid regime to, at the very least, provide accommodations for the migrant 
workers. 
Another concern that emerged was one of health, more specifically disease transmission propagated 
by migrant workers.  As South Africa‘s mining capacities grew, such as its gold mining industry along the 
Witwatersrand, the impact on patterns of sickness and health grew as well causing great concern among 
those running the industry as well as those participating in its operation (Packard, 1987).  These concerns 
quickly evolved into and exacerbated tensions between native South African labourers and other African 
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non-nationals.  Money the migrant labourers brought home was usually far above the average rural 
income, which often led to conspicuous consumption and spending.  In this way, migrants became a big 
attraction to women in the villages and it was therefore believed then that HIV/AIDS would spread rapidly 
if these men and women were carriers or sufferers (Chirwa, 1998).  The position changed in October, 
1987 when the South African government heavily influenced by ultra-rightist white elements in the 
Conservative Party, issued a declaration prohibiting HIV carriers and AIDS sufferers from immigrating into 
the country (Chirwa, 1998).  Those already in the country would possibly be deported.  It became an 
offence for an individual or institution to knowingly abet an HIV carrier or AIDS sufferer to enter or stay in 
the country.  All those immigrating to South Africa to work or study had to carry an HIV-free certificate 
issued within 14 days prior of their entry into the country (Chirwa, 1998).  As a result of the growing 
tensions between migrant workers and South African nationals, the government even went so far as to 
threaten to expel 1.5 million foreign workers.   
Migrant labourers were also used as a political tool against countries that hosted the African National 
Congress (ANC).  For example, in the late eighties, the South African government expelled some 60,000 
Mozambican workers for a landmine blast on the Mozambican/South Africa border that was blamed on 
the ANC (Chirwa, 1998).  The apartheid regime exercised with stringent consistency the same 
segregatory policies towards those wishing to enter the country and those who already had.  Whites who 
left Mozambique at independence were welcomed in South Africa and given permanent residence 
whereas black Mozambicans who fled the civil war of the late eighties and nineties were not, entering the 
country as undocumented migrants (Peberdy, 2010).  A century of lax immigration policies coupled with 
growing tensions between nationals and non-nationals would begin to change the composition of 
demographics within the country.  One of the legacies of apartheid, ―institutionalized othering‖, has been 
viewed by many as the driving force behind today‘s urban violence as well as a strong catalyst for inter-






Post-1994 Migratory Patterns 
By far the most significant change in cross-border migration in South Africa in the 1990s has been the 
dramatic increase in noncontract migration.  Africans from other parts of the continent – mostly from the 
immediate region but now from as far away as Ghana and Somalia – are entering South Africa in 
increasing numbers to look for work, to visit friends, and to sell and buy goods (McDonald, 2000).  
Documented border crossings from countries in the SADC alone have increased almost seven-fold to 3 
million visitors a year since 1990, and there are also significant increases in the number of visitors from 
Eastern Europe and Asia.  Undocumented migration would appear to have increased dramatically as 
well.  Estimates range from 2.5 to 12 million undocumented migrants living in the country at any one time 
(out of a total South African population of approximately 38 million), and although these figures are most 
likely exaggerated there can be little doubt that there has been a significant increase in the number of 
people overstaying their visas and entering the country without proper documentation (McDonald, 2000).  
At the risk of over-simplifying a long history of scholarly research on the subject, it can be said that the 
bulk of the literature on cross-border migration in the region paints a very negative picture of the 
consequences of migratory labor and apartheid-era immigration laws (McDonald, 2000).  This is not to 
suggest that all cross-border (Figure 1.) movement has been seen to be negative or that it affects all 
people in the same way, but the overwhelming sense from the literature is that cross-border movement 
has had a deleterious impact on individuals, families, communities and states in the region (McDonald, 




Figure 1. South Africa‘s Contiguous Neighbors. 
Past research points to three stages of immigration into and within the Republic of South Africa, and it 
is the cumulative effect of all three that have shaped the geographic landscape as it is known today.  
Those stages are 1) mining and agriculture sector, 2) Apartheid-era, and 3) Post-Apartheid era migration 
(Muanamhola, 2010).  After decades of white minority rule, the apartheid regime ended on April 27, 1994 
and would have tremendous ramifications on the demographic landscape throughout the country.  Yet 
unlike earlier patterns of labour migration, a large percentage of recent immigrants have come from cities 
in other parts of Africa, and they have largely gravitated to the urban areas in South Africa (Murray, 
2003).  The ―urban-to-urban‖ movement marks a distinctive shift in the historical pattern of labour 
migration to South Africa (Murray, 2003).  The years leading up to April 27, 1994 were signified by the 
relative ease and rapid influx of African non-nationals into the country primarily to serve the growing 
needs of the mining industry.  In contrast, however, the years following apartheid would be signified with 
border posts closing, strict enforcing of immigration legislation, and waves of internal migration within the 
former apartheid-instituted Bantustans.  It is likely that the 1990s will be remembered as the decade in 
which migration in southern Africa became a critical challenge for the governments of the region.   
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The years since the democratic victory of the ANC in 1994 have witnessed unprecedented population 
movements, with a strong and seemingly underterrable influx of immigrants into South Africa (Marion, 
1998).  At the outset, the new ANC government granted amnesty to many unauthorized immigrants 
wishing to remain in the country, promised to relax the stringent and racially biased immigrant policies 
that had prevailed under white minority rule, and vowed to protect the rights of immigrants who, in 
increasing numbers, have sought refuge, legally or illegally, in South Africa (Murray, 2003).  According to 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), police in South Africa arrest more people for violating immigration laws 
each year than for any other reason (Murray, 2003).   
As apartheid fell, and the new South Africa came into being, thousands of already-illegal and legal 
immigrants were granted amnesty to remain within the country (Murray, 2003).  This pool of amnesty 
recipients included nationals from countries that gave refuge to tens of thousands of black South Africans, 
as well as political support to the ANC during the years of apartheid, and as a consequence, suffered 
considerable economic hardship and war inflicted devastation (Murray, 2003).  As South Africa has now 
tightened its borders to prevent apartheid-era numbers of these migrants from accessing the country, the 
source countries of what once sent thousands into South Africa are particularly resentful at the rejection 
they now face (Murray, 2003).  Apartheid-era immigration laws remain in force in South Africa today 
(Crush, 2001), but there have been steps made by the government to acknowledge and protect those 
entering its borders.  The 1997 Green Paper; the first ever refugee protection legislation in South Africa‘s 
history, recommended the development of a framework specific to refugee protection.  The 2008 
Refugees Amendment Act (Act No. 33), an amended act of the previous act of 1998 (Handmaker, 2001) 
affords protection to asylum seekers to South Africa.  Asylum seekers and refugees have the right to 
work, study and access medical treatment as if they were South African nationals (Peberdy, 2010). 
Two types of migratory patterns signify the post-1994 demographic landscape of South Africa, 
internal migration consisting of groups of people who for decades were isolated to their respective 
homelands, and external migration consisting of African non-nationals immigrating from other countries 
across sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world.  Figure 2. offers a glimpse of how drastically the 
demographics within South Africa‘s mining industry changed during the first decade of an apartheid-free 
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South Africa.  Three of the four largest source countries of labour, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland 
saw a relatively steady decline in employment of its nationals within gold mines in South Africa.  This is 
partly a result of the application of more liberal immigration policies at points of entry and partly as a result 
of the shifting away from contract labour within South Africa‘s mining industry (Peberdy, 2010). 
 
Figure 2. Mine Labour Employment on the Gold Mines, 1990-2006 (Peberdy, 2010). 
There are no reliable methodologies available for determining the actual number of foreign 
immigrants and migrants in South Africa today (Murray, 2003).  But what is not disputable is that the 
number of illegal immigrants deported has dramatically increased, from an estimated 90,000 in 1994, to 
around 200,000 in 2000 (Murray, 2003).  Equally astounding is the fact that illegal immigrants were 
deported to at least ninety-two countries throughout the world in 2000 (Murray, 2003).  As time passes, 
and as experience from around the world shows, human population movements continue in spite of state 
controls, a pattern which given the historical fact that migration has a fundamental feature of society long 
before state systems were imposed, will in all likelihood persist indefinitely in South Africa (Marion, 1998).  
The distance-decay relationship of inter-national and intra-national migration has weakened considerably 
since 1994, and as such monitoring South Africa‘s borders is proving to be a labour and resource-




















South Africa shares 7,000km of land borders with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, 
Swaziland and Lesotho.  The Zimbabwean and Mozambican borders are protected by 220km of 
potentially lethal electric fence that runs intermittently along the border (Peberdy, 2010).  Importantly for 
regional migrants entry has been made harder as the number of land border posts was reduced from 52 
to 19 between 1994 and 1997 (Peberdy, 2010).  The steps the South African government has taken to 
slow the influx of immigration can do little to prevent the millions of non-nationals that cross its borders 
every year.  Figure 3. shows the total number of border crossings between the years 1996-2005 
(Peberdy, 2010). 
 
Figure 3. Total Border Crossings, 1996-2005 (Peberdy, 2010). 
It is impossible to know how many foreigners are in South Africa at any one time as official data can 
be difficult to interpret.  It is possible to determine in what capacity migrants are entering the country.  
There has been a significant increase in the number of asylum seekers and refugees from the rest of the 
continent and further a field during the years after apartheid, as well as an increased movement of visitors 
and cross-border traders from the region.  To contrast this increase in movement types, there has been a 
significant decrease in the number of contract workers within South Africa‘s mining industries.  There has 
also been a significant fall in the number of permanent residence awards given out (Figure 4.), as well as 

















Figure 4. Approved Applications for Permanent Residence, 1990-2005 (Peberdy, 2010). 
Inter-Provincial Migration 
A stark example of intra-provincial migration within the country is that which John Western refers to 
as the ―Africanization of the Cape‖ (Western, 2001).  After apartheid fell, so too did the restrictions that for 
generations segregated black South Africans to their homelands.  A region that had been off limits to 
black migration throughout the apartheid years was the Western Cape.  Historically the Western Cape 
had been home to the Cape Coloured people but as apartheid crumbled, so too did the restrictions 
keeping out non-whites from the area.  Western writes, ―…at the southern tip of Africa, the culmination of 
one of the world‘s largest population shifts is there for the witnessing‖ (Western, 2001).  The population 
shift is so great that the population within the metropolitan areas of the Western Cape has more than 
doubled in the last thirty years.   
The Cape Coloured people had lived in the region for hundreds of years and had been unable to 
migrate with ease to other regions of the country because of the Bantustan system.  With the removal of 
this system, the millennium long southward migration of Bantu-speaking people originally from north of 
the equator finally arrived in the Cape (Western, 2001).   
Feeling boxed into the continent‘s southwestern most corner, the large influx of immigrants into the 
region has caused great concern among the Cape Coloured community.  The Cape Coloured are direct 

















Cape Town in 1652 (Western, 2001), a date that far precedes the date the first Bantu-speaking travelers 
arrived.  Yet, many are those who wish to defend their own ―Coloured‖ interests wherein many contend 
that one of those interests is evidently ―their little bit of the world‖, their southwestern corner of South 
Africa; their veritable Capeness, for the Cape Coloured do not exist anywhere else in the world (Western, 
2001).  As today‘s population at the Cape, the Cape Coloured are in themselves the product of 
dispossession in that they are very much and completely a new amalgam of the local, the imported, and 
the invading European dispossessors.  Yet ―South African‖ in the minds of many Cape Coloured comes to 
be interpreted as ―Black African‖; those who were once termed ―Natives‖ and those who outnumbered 
Coloureds nine to one in the country (Western, 2001).   
It is this highly contested definition of what it means to be South African in a post-apartheid South 
Africa that is the basis for much debate and conflict across all levels, for during the apartheid years, the 
sociopolitical hierarchy within the country was as follows: 1) White, 2) non-White (including Coloured and 
Indian/Asian), and 3) Black.  Eighteen years has passed and the sociopolitical hierarchy within the 
country has changed to: 1) Black, 2) Coloured/Indian/Asian, and 3) White.  The non-White, or Coloured, 
those of mixed race and Asian descent, finds themselves in exactly the same sociopolitical level of 
influence as they had been in for decades.  Before 1991, the demographics within Cape Town, the largest 
city in the Western Cape, primarily consisted of Coloureds and Whites, with a minimal representation of 
Black Africans (Western, 2001).  The primary cause of the rapid migration of black South Africans into the 
Western Cape is the ease of movement afforded to South Africans, black, white, and Coloured.  
According to neoclassical migration theory, labor migration is likely to occur in such an environment as a 
result in differences in location-specific employment opportunities or wages (Zuberi, 2004).  This is 
especially true in this case.  In 1999 official government statistics had the Western Cape experiencing a 
poverty rate of 28%, whereas that of the Eastern Cape was the nation‘s highest, at 71% (Western, 2001).  
From 1982 to 1992 the Black African population of Cape Town more than doubled, nearly all the 
newcomers Xhosa people from the former homelands of the Ciskei and Transkei (Western, 2001).  The 





Figure 5. Western and Eastern Cape 
External In-Migration 
One of the most significant changes in patterns of migration since 1994 is the arrival of asylum 
seekers and refugees from the rest of the continent as well as from overseas (Peberdy, 2010).  The 
largest claimant-generating countries between 1994 – 2001 were: Angola, Burundi, Zaire (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) and Somalia (Peberdy, 2010).  Figure 6. shows the total number of refugee 




Figure 6.  Refugee applications by country of origin, 2006 (Peberdy, 2010). 
Contemporary movements of people to South Africa are characterized by considerable diversity of 
purpose and heterogeneity of social composition.  While some migration is random, most of it is not.  
Migrants tend to follow specific paths and move along particular trajectories (Murray, 2003).  Neither the 
international borders nor the immigration laws of the Republic of South Africa can halt the present 
permeation of foreign clandestine immigrants from African lands to the north.  They are leaving behind 
not only the economic incapacity of African states in the north but also their societal horror: political 
oppression, ethnic discrimination, civil war, and genocide.  South Africa for them is quite simply the most 
immediately available destination (Western, 2001).  Upon arrival, these groups quickly form strong bonds 
amongst others of similar flight forming an African Diaspora spread throughout the country but clustered 
in and around South Africa‘s larger, urban centres.  Studies reveal, for example, that the provinces of 
Gauteng and Mpumalanga are two choice immigration centres for Mozambicans (Muanamoha, 2010).  
Kinship, common language, and religious affiliations might be operative at home, but in South Africa, 
















Immigrant transnational communities create new forms of vernacular cosmopolitanism whose 
manifestations no longer refer to the acquisition of an identity through full assimilation to a new cultural 
milieu but rather to the maintenance of a hybrid, syncretic identity neither ―here‖ nor ―there‖ (Murray, 
2003).  Whereas people of African descent were permitted to enter the country prior to 1994 solely as 
contract workers in the mining and agricultural sectors of the economy, current immigration laws are 
designed to attract skilled foreign workers.  In fact, the reality that thousands of undocumented 
immigrants are believed to be working in the country today implies that legal status does not necessarily 
place a constraint on a person‘s ability to get a job (Zuberi, 2004). 
The attempt to account for and monitor the activity of immigrants within the borders of South Africa is 
virtually impossible, but attempts have been made.  The Southern African Migration System (SAMS) 
exists among countries with close historical, political, cultural, and economic ties. This migration system 
primarily covers a subset of SADC members including: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Figure 7. below).  Findings from the SAMS indicated that by 
the mid 80‘s, there were over 100,000 immigrants from neighboring countries working in South Africa‘s 
mining industry (Zuberi, 2004).   
 
Figure 7. SAMS Members, 2004 
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In addition immigrants belonging to SADC nations do not require visas to enter South Africa, and many of 
them have social networks in South Africa that they can use to enter the country legally or illegally. It is 
likely that some SADC citizens take advantage of these conditions to migrate and search for work in 
South Africa even if they are undocumented.   
Conflict Triggers 
a. Othering 
Othering is an inherently human condition, one that has been seen in many historic cases where 
groups undergoing ―diminishing contrasts‖ yet engaging in one-sided exaggeration of the same 
increasingly diminishing contrasts, often resulting in group conflict.  There are many examples of historic 
―othering‖ events through group conflict, from the discrimination against the Burakumin in Japan, the 
violence against blacks in the American South following the abolition of slavery, the violence between 
equals among the court nobility in France and Germany, the growth of anti-Semitism in Germany, the civil 
war in the Balkans, and the ethnic cleansing in Rwanda (Matsinhe, 2011).  Inter-group conflict in the new 
South Africa is a complex and highly debated phenomenon.   
In order to understand conflict in terms of how to prevent it, it is vital to identify the triggers of the 
conflict.  Consistent with this statement is a tradition of research on group conflict that suggests group 
pride – whether ethnic, national, or gender based is the positive half of prejudice.  De Figueiredo and 
Elkins‘ research on group conflict dynamics asks whether group pride or ―particularism‖ is the solution to 
ethnocentrism, or its very embodiment (de Figueiredo, 2003).  They focus on a specific kind of in-
group/out-group relationship, attitudes toward one‘s nation and attitudes toward immigrants to that nation, 
where each is defined in terms of the ―other‖, meaning nationalists are defined in relation to non-nationals 
and immigrants are defined in relation to nationalists (de Figueiredo, 2003).  Their research reveals that 
comparisons to another are central to group identity studies and that the prevailing approach of the study 
of ethnocentrism, in-group bias, and prejudice, presumes that in-group love and out-group hate are 
reciprocally related.  Ethnocentrism states that there must be loyalty to the group, brotherhood within, and 
hatred and contempt for ―the other‖ (de Figueiredo, 2003).  Ethnocentrism gives rise to the patriot and the 
national, strengthening the identity of the in-group by defining it for what it is not.   
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The main difference between nationalism and patriotism is that patriotism is self-referential whereas 
nationalism is comparative, in fact mostly downwardly comparative.  The established often imagine the 
physical aspect of the outsiders as marks of their inferiority, thus setting them apart as fundamentally 
different, a part of a collective fantasy evolved by the established group (Elias, 1994).  During apartheid, 
the asymmetric power between the two groups of White and non-White was so great that the weaker 
group began to measure themselves with the yardstick of their oppressors (Elias, 1994).  This inter-group 
dynamic exacerbated the apartheid-era culture of domination.  A culture of domination is self-perpetuating 
and requires the presence of the ―other‖ to dominate, whether the ―other‖ is white or black.  The challenge 
in a post-apartheid South Africa rests on the responsibility to use power and influence in a markedly 
different manner than the way it was wielded by the deposed oppressors (Jones, 2006).  To quote 
Mamdani, ―The political world set in motion by the modern state and modern colonialism generates 
subaltern identities endlessly, in binary pairs.  We need to break out of the worldview of not only the cat, 
but also the rat, not only the settler but also the native.  Unless we can break out of the worldview of the 
rat, post-colonialism will remain a purgatory punctuated by non-revolutionary violence‖ (Mamdani, 2001). 
There is a combination of elements from studies on state violence that uncovers a postcolonial 
equation in which the colonized ―other‖ transmogrifies into a hated ―self‖, which then is projected on to an 
imagined ―other‖ (Ngugi, 1997; Soyinka, W).  Because of their dress, mannerisms, and language 
differences some immigrants, particularly from West African countries are distinguishable from black 
South Africans, and immigrants from central and western African are more readily identifiable as a foreign 
―other‖ (Murray, 2003).  The naming of others is a key component in the relationship between the politics 
of identity and the attachment to place in contemporary nation-states (Murray, 2003). 
b. A Perceived Threat 
For conflict to fully manifest itself there generally needs to exist more than just the passion and zeal 
for one‘s country.  A study by Feldman and Stenner (1997) suggests that authoritarian traits manifest 
themselves in intolerance or hostility only under a certain set of conditions, in particular the presence of a 
perceived threat (de Figueiredo, 2003).  This is just the case in urban centres with active immigrant 
communities in South Africa where African non-nationals are viewed as the perceived threat by a majority 
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black South African nationalistic rhetoric.  This staunch nationalism can be traced back to the replication 
of imperialist processes of cultural reitification and binarization (Appiah, 1992).  It has been well 
documented that immigrants, legal and illegal, are viewed as a threatening presence to a segment of the 
majority black South African population.  Migrant workers and mobile ethnic groups are often cited as the 
major vectors of infectious diseases while foreign workers and hawkers are viewed as a threat to the local 
population because they compete for the available jobs, commodity markets and other facilities (Chirwa, 
1998).  Those who see themselves aggrieved choose an enemy that is perceived both as gaining 
undeserved advantages and as marginal, and hence socially vulnerable (Murray, 2003). 
c. Youth Bulges 
Recent research has revealed emerging interests in macro-demographic triggers of conflict such as 
migration, ethnic group dynamics, and youth bulges, referring to the number of young persons in a 
population (Urdal, 2004; Urdal, 2005; Urdal, 2006).  The first comparative empirical study of the role of 
youth bulges in armed conflict was undertaken by Nazli Choucri (1974).  By comparing qualitative case 
studies of 45 ‗local conflicts‘ but not comparing these with any control cases, she found that the existence 
of large youth cohorts did play a minor role in ten conflicts, but was never a crucial factor in the initiation 
of these conflicts.  In his studies on the demography of conflict and violence, Henrik Urdal suggests that 
micro-demographic triggers such as total population, high population pressure on potentially arable land, 
and large refugee populations must also include a macro-demographic trigger for conflict to occur (Urdal, 
2005).  In an empirical test of these propositions, the study suggests that youth bulges are particularly 
associated with an increasingly high risk of internal conflict in starkly autocratic regimes, but a similar 
effect is also found for highly democratic countries (Urdal, 2006).  Urdal‘s research on youth bulges 
focuses on whether youth bulges may increase the risk of three different forms of internal political 
violence: armed conflict, terrorism and riots (Urdal, 2006).  This study adds to the existing literature on the 
demography of conflict in several ways. It discusses how youth bulges may affect the risk of political 
violence, drawing on two prominent theoretical perspectives concerning opportunity versus motive for civil 
war, as well as on recent advances in economic demography, to identify a possible causal explanation for 
why cohort size in itself may influence the propensity for political violence (Urdal, 2006; Urdal, 2004). 
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While previous studies have tested the youth bulge hypothesis for high-intensity civil wars, this 
research studies new low-intensity conflict data and finds robust support for a relationship.  Urdal 
identifies relevant contextual factors believed to interact with youth bulges to increase the risk of political 
violence and tests these propositions empirically.  He provides the first empirical results suggesting that 
youth bulges may also increase the risk of terrorism and more spontaneous forms of political violence like 
riots, and violent demonstrations.  It is suggested that youth bulges may be a better predictor of low 
intensity political violence than large-scale wars (Urdal, 2006).  Rapid population growth together with the 
lack of unemployment opportunities for youths, rather than environmental degradation, represents a 
considerable risk of civil violence and ―failed states‖ (Ware, 2005).  Research shows that during times of 
political instability, the risk of large-scale violent dissent increases substantially (Carey, 2007).   
It has been argued that high unemployment among educated youth is one of the most destabilizing 
and potentially violent sociopolitical phenomena in any regime (Braungart, 1984; Winckler, 2002).  It's not 
enough to increase level of education of cohorts, but to then be able to successfully transition these 
educated individuals into the labour market.  Huntington argues that societies are particularly conflict 
prone when the number of young people aged fifteen to twenty-four reaches a ‗‗critical level‘‘ of 20% of 
the overall population in a country (Huntington, 1996). 
It is argued that a large population makes it more difficult for regimes to keep tight control (Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003).  Identifying the structural causes of political violence potentially enables us to reduce the 
risk factors (Urdal, 2006).  One of the leading theorists on the role of youth in political violence, Jack A. 
Goldstone, claims that youth have played a prominent role in political violence throughout recorded 
history and the existence of large youth bulges have historically been associated with times of political 
crisis (Goldstone, 2001).  Among prominent historical events that have been linked to the existence of 
youth bulges is the role played by the historically large youth cohorts (caused by the rapid decline in 
infant mortality some 20 to30 years earlier) in the French revolution of 1789, and the importance of the 
economic depression hitting the largest German youth cohorts in explaining the rise of Nazism in 
Germany in the 1930s (Moller, 1968; Urdal, 2004).  Figure 8. provides a model for the assumed 
relationship between youth bulges and armed conflict as put forward by Urdal.  The model assumes that 
20 
 
youth bulges are likely to experience unemployment because they increase the supply of labor 
substantially when entering the labor market.   
 
Figure 8. Youth Bulges as a Source of Armed Conflict (Urdal, 2004). 
Generations that are considerably larger than their parents‘ generations are likely to run into several 
societal ‗bottlenecks‘, straining social institutions.  Most theoretical works concerned with youth bulges 
point to limited absorption capacity of the labor market as the most important factor for causing 
grievances among youth.  Unemployment in any society weakens the political system‘s legitimacy and 
stability.  Such conditions produce a climate of radicalism particularly among unattached youth who have 
the least to lose in the gamble and struggle for revolutionary gain (Braungart,1984; Urdal, 2004). 
A second hypothesis Urdal‘s research tests is the less economic growth a country experiences, the 
stronger is the conflict conducive effect of youth bulges.  Well-educated youth have often been observed 
in central positions in episodes of riots, from the streets of Jakarta and Teheran, to Belgrade and Harare 
demanding democratic reforms. One reason why students would want to revolt is if their aspirations of 
employment and political influence are not met.  Choucri speculates, ―the greater the unemployment 
among educated youth, the greater the propensity for dissatisfactions, instability, and violence‖ (Choucri, 
1974; Urdal, 2004). 
The underlying argument of why youth bulges create opportunities for violent conflict lies in the sheer 
number of individuals that make up the bulge.  Relative to previous generations, the pool of potential 
rebels increases and, since large youth cohorts stretch the limits of social institutions such as the labor 
market, youth bulges in themselves are likely to produce more aggrieved individuals.  In addition to being 
21 
 
more open to change, young people generally have fewer responsibilities for families and careers and are 
free of constraints that tend to make activism too time consuming or risky for other groups to engage in 
(Goldstone, 1999).  Some empirical evidence suggests that ethnicity is the form of social segmentation 
that is most likely to be transformed into violent conflict as a result of the existence of youth bulges.  
Huntington argues that the existence of large youth bulges account for many of the inter-civilizational 
conflicts in the late twentieth century.  He holds that the most serious episodes of ethnic violence in Sri 
Lanka occurred during periods when the rioting ethnic groups had their youth bulge peaks (Huntington, 
1996).  Subsequent research validates these findings by revealing a significant correlation between risk of 
ethnic conflict and youth bulge presence (Esty et al., 1998).   
Past research reveals, however, that the presence of a significant youth bulge alone is not enough to 
directly influence inter-group conflict.  It has been discovered that an auxiliary set of triggers must be 
present within a youth bulge for the successful transition of aggrieved youth to rebellious youth to occur.   
The first trigger is relative deprivation.  A gap must exist between what a group believes it should possess 
and what it actually possesses.  The second trigger is a strong collective identity amongst the deprived, 
and the third trigger is poor service delivery by the government (Urdal, 2004).  It is the combination of 
these three triggers together with the presence of a large youth bulge that significantly increases a 
region‘s susceptibility for internal armed conflict. 
Moving beyond demographics as a primary contributor for conflict, there exists an exhaustive list of 
research devoted towards the analysis of development within a society as causal towards violent conflict 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2001; de Soysa, 2002; Hauge & Ellingsen, 2001; Hegre et al., 2001; Henderson & 
Singer, 2000).  Sen argues that mortality is a strong indicator of a country‘s level of development, 
specifically infant mortality (Sen, 1998).  The level of infant mortality in a society is highly dependent on 
both material living standards, levels of education, gender inequalities and health care systems.   
These factors provide evidence that the combination of youth bulges and poor economic performance 
can be explosive.  This is bad news for regions that currently exhibit both features to a large extent, often 
in coexistence with intermediary and unstable political regimes, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Arab world (Urdal, 2004). 
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The work of human geographers can be grouped into two widely accepted traditions of conflict study.  
The first tradition, often coined the ―greed‖ perspective, is called the opportunity-oriented tradition and has 
its roots in economic theory.  This tradition focuses on the structural conditions that provide opportunities 
for a group to engage in conflict with another group (Collier, 2000).  The second tradition is called the 
motive-oriented tradition, or ‗‗grievance‘‘ perspective, and has its origins in relative deprivation theory.  
Theorists implementing the grievance perspective during the analysis of a conflict event tend to view the 
eruption of political violence as a rational means to redress economic or political grievances (Gurr 1970; 
Sambanis, 2002).  Collier further argues that higher levels of education among men act to reduce the risk 
of political violence and in a related analysis of 15 industrialized countries over a period of more than 20 
years, Korenman & Neumark (1997) find that large youth cohorts are associated with a significant 
increase in youth unemployment rates.  So not only do youth bulges provide an unusually high supply of 
individuals with low opportunity cost but an individual belonging to a relatively large youth cohort generally 
also has a lower opportunity cost relative to a young person born into a smaller cohort (Urdal, 2006).  The 
study reveals that large youth bulges increase the risk of armed conflict. 
Group Grievances 
Xenophobic violence is viewed as a deeply institutionalized legacy of South Africa‘s apartheid past 
and has to be specifically contextualized against a broader pattern of attacks conducted against African 
non-nationals since the beginning of 1994.  African non-nationals are most likely to suffer public violence 
by South Africans who blame them for crime and unemployment and see them as unfair competitors in 
the struggle for jobs, houses and other resources deemed ‗deserving‘ for the South Africans whose 
citizenship makes them legitimate heirs to the spoils of democracy (Nyar, 2010).  Foreigners who have 
come to South Africa to work, study, or for other purposes have experienced a dramatic upswing of 
harassment and intolerance in their daily lives (Murray, 2003).   
Grievances tend to arise if possibilities to influence the political system and attain elite positions are 
limited (Urdal, 2004).  The existence of objective deprivation, the mere fact that people are poor, seldom 
produces strong grievances.  Rather, violent conflicts may erupt from cases of ‗relative deprivation‘ (Gurr, 
1970).  Individuals and groups can experience relative deprivation when they perceive a gap between the 
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situation they believe they deserve and the situation that they have actually achieved.  This is certainly 
the case in many areas of South Africa.  Within South Africa, there are several strong positions held 
among South African nationals concerning the country‘s immigration policies.  The most common 
grievances voiced by South African nationals towards African non-nationals can be divided into five major 
categories.   
I. Competition for Jobs 
There are those who believe in opening South Africa‘s doors to skilled migrants and investors who 
can make substantial contributions to the country‘s development.  But there are also those who oppose 
immigration as they believe immigrants take jobs away from South Africa nationals and that they 
aggravate the high levels of unemployment (Marion, 1998).  These opponents argue that immigration is 
an obstacle to economic integration for the African majority who anticipated gains in employment and 
living standards after the demise of apartheid.  These beliefs are so strongly held by some South Africans 
that violence has often been unleashed on unsuspecting groups of foreign-born workers, particularly 
street vendors in cities like Johannesburg (Zuberi, 2004).  Interestingly enough, disgruntled South 
Africans have, however, focused their wrath almost exclusively on fellow Africans, virtually ignoring the 
influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe and Asia (Murray, 2003).  In their study on rentier state theory, 
Basedau & Lay discover that grievance transmission channel suggests that perceived deprivation of 
social groups or indirect negative economic consequences of resource wealth create ―grievances‖ and 
trigger violent uprising (Basedau, 2009).  The concept of the rentier state was developed with regard to 
Middle Eastern oil-producing states such as Iran and the Gulf Monarchies and argues that the function of 
the state in rentier economies is to distribute rent (Beblawi, 1987; Smith, 2004).  This adverse economic 
environment has heightened the tensions between local workers and foreign migrant workers.   
II. Competition for Women 
Marion describes through the use of polls, surveys and focus groups how many non-national males 
are viewed by South African national males as competitors for women.  Past research also reveals that 




III. Spread of Disease 
Within South Africa, the politics of disease, and HIV/AIDS in particular, can hardly be separated from 
the general xenophobia associated with the competition for jobs (Chirwa, 1998).   
IV. Spread of Crime 
The popular stereotype of foreigners constructed by many South African nationals is that foreign 
immigrants are linked to criminal activities.  For those who harbor anti-immigrant sentiments, unwanted 
foreigners epitomize the shape-shifting modalities of a racialized ―otherness‖.  This sentiment is reiterated 
at all scales, arguably beginning with the government.  Such sentiment can lead to generalizations and 
stereotyping as evidenced by the unsubstantiated claim made by former Senior Police Superintendent 
Johan Steyn that, ―90 percent of criminals who break into homes, commit armed robbery and rape the 
women are Zimbabweans‖ (Murray, 2003).  By casually associating Zimbabweans with bank robberies 
and house break-ins, Mozambicans with gun running, and Nigerians with drug trafficking, South Africans 
stamp immigrant communities with an essence of criminality (Danso & McDonald, 2001).  Claims, 
whether substantiated or not, that link immigrants with criminality contribute to a climate of hostility and 
distrust and also fortify the distinction between ―us‖ and ―them‖ (Murray, 2003).  Media such as TV and 
film, as they mix music, background sounds, words and visual images together, are particularly adept at 
invoking such dispositions, and also at working upon them (O Tuathail, 2003).  In many ways, the media 
exacerbates these feelings held by many South Africans through xenophobic language. 
V. Poor Service Delivery 
In 1994, around 12 million people in South Africa lacked access to clean drinking water, and 21 
million lacked adequate sanitation.  Only 36% of the population had access to electricity.  Estimations of 
unemployment rates have ranged from 25% to 40%.  But they were as high as 70-80% in some urban 
communities (Peberdy, 2010).  Access to housing and service delivery remain extremely problematic 
leaving many black South Africans, and to a lesser extent, Coloured South Africans, incredibly 





Xenophobia in the New South Africa   
Racism is the name for that dimension by which persons assigned to another group are kept at a 
distance because they are considered racially inferior.  Xenophobia can designate the way that others are 
kept at a distance because they are considered different (Banton, 1996).  Universalism says that 
―universalist conception achieves explicit formulation‖ and its origins can be traced back to the early 
Roman Empire when, in AD 212, Roman citizenship was extended to all free men (Banton, 1996).  
Another example of early universalist national identity can be found in the sixteenth century when the 
Catholic Church recognized that the indigenous people of the Americas had souls.  Further examples can 
be found within the French Revolution with the adoption of the Declaration des Droits de l’homme et du 
Citoyen (Declaration of the Human and Civil Rights), as well as within communist doctrine (Banton, 1996).  





 century Europe.  One of its most distinguishing features of modern geopolitical 
imagination is what Agnew terms ―a state-centric account of spatiality‖ characterized by three 
geographical assumptions: 1) that states have exclusive sovereign power over their territories, 2) that 
―domestic‖ and ―foreign‖ are separate and distinct realms and 3) that the boundaries of a state define the 
boundaries of ―society‖ (Agnew, 1998).  Universalism and a modern geopolitical imagination are relevant 
to conflict studies within South Africa because they serve as the backdrop to explain contemporary group 
identity formation theory within the country.  Together they help highlight five separate theories of othering 
as seen across the geographic landscape of South Africa today.   
The first theory, known as Biocultural Theory, locates xenophobia at the level of visible differences, or 
―otherness‖, i.e. in terms of physical biological factors and cultural differences exhibited by African 
foreigners in the country; essentially othering through physical differences.  Biocultural Theory places an 
uneven loathing of African foreign nationals squarely on their alleged visible ―otherness‖. 
The second theory is known as State-Cited Theory and situates xenophobia within the 
apartheid/post-apartheid transitional period, wherein broad social institutions such as the media produce 
negative representations of Africa and African foreigners, representations that are congruent with the 
state‘s criminalization of African foreign nationals as ―illegals‖, ―illegal aliens‖, ―illegal immigrants‖, 
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criminals‖, and ―drug traffickers‖, most notably by the Department of Home Affairs (DHS) and the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) (Harris, 2002).   
The third theory is known as Scapegoat Theory and blames African nationals for social ills such as 
crime, disease and unemployment rates.  This theory is the direct manifestation of frustration by the poor 
and unemployed citizens of South Africa.   
The fourth theory is known as Isolation Theory and contends that the hostility towards foreign 
nationals issues from the prolonged seclusion of South Africans, particularly blacks, which precluded 
contact not simply with the world beyond Africa but with Africa itself.  The demise of the apartheid regime 
put a direct end to that isolation (Morris, 1998).  Many researchers believe that South Africa‘s historic 
isolation from the continent is a major incubator for the widespread distrust and suspicion aimed at 
foreigners (Murray, 2003).   
The fifth and final theory is known as Relative Deprivation Theory and contends that the 
dissatisfaction and frustration with the inadequacy and slowness redressing the inequalities of apartheid 
are leading the deprived masses to turn against foreigners.  It is believed that this theory is the ideal 
situation for a phenomenon like xenophobia to take root and flourish (Tshitereke, 1999). 
The apartheid regime used ―othering‖ in such a way that strengthened a broad and homogenous 
class of ―non-whites‖ into one group.  As apartheid fell, so did this classification, thereby diluting the non-
white proportion of the country into smaller, weaker groups of identity, causing these smaller groups to be 
more prone to conflict with one another (Marion, 1998).  In the 1990s, as authoritarian regimes collapsed 
world-wide, O‘Donnell & Schmitter identified three steps in a transitional process: 1) liberalization, 2) 
democratization, and 3) socialization.  In the first step, liberalization, a range of rights and liberties are 
extended to the populace previously denied them, as occurred in South Africa.  In the second step, 
democratization, citizenship, participation and representation for all in the political process is extended, 
again as has occurred in South Africa.  However, within the third step, socialization, social and economic 
equality are the goal.  It is here where South Africa has failed.  The key weakness of the author‘s 
assumption was to assume an automatic sequence from one step to another, which has not occurred 
here or in many other nations (O‘Donnell, 1998). 
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A generalized term used by those researching the tensions and ensuing conflict in a post-apartheid 
South Africa is ―Africa‘s fear of itself‖, a term that is exemplified by the loathing of black foreign nationals 
in South Africa, particularly by the nation‘s ex-victims of apartheid.  This term is increasingly becoming a 
fundamental component of South Africa‘s collective identification and public culture.  Since the collapse of 
apartheid, the phantom of ―Makwerekwere‖ (slang for foreigner, illegal, outsider) has been constructed 
and deployed in and through public discourse to render Africans from outside the borders orderable as 
the nation‘s bogeymen (Matsinhe, 2011; Petkou. 2005).  Historically, South Africa has set itself apart from 
the rest of Africa as a ―European Outpost‖, so naturally after the fall of apartheid, the ―European Outpost‖ 
quickly became ―Africanized‖ (Adebayo, 1996). 
Several theses have been put forward to explain what is construed as xenophobia in South Africa.  
During the apartheid era, the imposition of the will of the oppressive white minority over that of a weaker 
non-white majority caused self-contempt and self-loathing among the weaker group.  Research shows 
that over time, this constructed identity will often manifest itself in destructive behaviour including 
contempt and destruction of those who resemble them the most (Matsinhe, 2011).  This explains in part 
why the victims of xenophobic discrimination are almost always black non-nationals and not white 
tourists, and that the perpetrators of the xenophobic discrimination are almost always black South African 
nationals.  All across the country, white non-nationals are generally viewed by the masses as wealth 
creators and therefore respected, whereas black non-nationals are viewed negatively (Shindondola, 
2002).   
A joint statement by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) and the South African Human 
Rights Commission (SAHRC) indicates that the victimization of black South Africans is being replaced by 
the victimization of African foreigners, noting that not only are more and more citizens becoming more 
xenophobic but they also perceive ―almost exclusively black foreigners‖ as directly responsible for rising 
unemployment and violent crime (Crush, 2001).  During the years of apartheid, the colonized began to 
idealize their identity in the image of the colonizer, out of which was born the idea of South African 
Exceptionalism.  The idea required that South Africans have or are meant to have lighter skin 
complexions than Africans from the greater continent (Matsinhe, 2011).  The ideology of South African 
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Exceptionalism is fundamental in the study of the geography of othering in a post-apartheid South Africa.  
It is important to note that the condition of possibility for the belief of exceptionalism is a mythologisation 
of selective reading of history that represses internal negativities (i.e. apartheid and its legacy, growing 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, persistent ignorance/illiteracy, growing poverty/unemployment/inequality, 
multiplication of shanty towns, increasing violent crime, and astonishing rates of rape (Matsinhe, 2011).   
The other product of post-apartheid identity formation is the aversion towards those similar but 
different and is manifested by the projection of the self, accrued through generations of vilification of the 
other (Matsinhe, 2011).  During the apartheid-era, the geography of South Africa was divided along lines 
of skin colour.  Black South Africans were viewed as just that, disregarding historic, ethnic, and tribal 
differences.  The defeat of the apartheid regime at the hands of the ANC solidified a form of exclusive 
black South African nationalism that has only turned violent in the presence of group grievances.   
Research validates the correlation between South African nationalism and prevalence of xenophobia 
in South Africa (Neocosmos, 2008).  The new South Africa has inherited a new form of identity formation 
that contains the following four traits: 1) South African Exceptionalism, 2) Imagined Citizenship, 3) Self-
Contempt, and 4) Narcissism of Minor Differences (Matsinhe, 2011).  Relations between South Africans 
and African foreign nationals are a striking case of narcissism of minor differences.  Immigrants are 
sources of fear and anxiety the more they are imagined as invisible intruders.  Immigrants from the 
southern African region in particular assimilate easily in South African given the cultural and economic 
hegemony of the country in the region (Matsinhe, 2011).  It is the combination of these four traits that has 
produced deeply rooted, and complex xenophobic sentiments within the hearts and minds of many black 
South African nationals.  The SAHRC has reported that illegal immigrants are often identified through 
profiling of skin colour, language, hairstyle and manner of dress (Matsinhe, 2011).   
Today urban apartheid geographies have remained largely intact, linked with the rapid increase in 
housing prices in the post-apartheid period and a government housing delivery programme unable to 
meet the demand for adequate housing (Jara, 2010).  This has resulted in mass movements of people 
into shack areas around larger, urban centres.  Tensions are generated as people compete for land, 
employment and business opportunities in spaces with tenuous material, political and social infrastructure 
29 
 
(Jara, 2010).  Although not as negative or as widespread as one would be led to believe by reports in the 
popular press, anti-immigrant sentiment is, nevertheless, a real concern.  Physical attacks on foreign 
street vendors in Johannesburg by South African traders, xenophobic press coverage, and prejudiced 
comments by senior politicians about the ―flood of illegal aliens‖ in the country are indicative of the kind of 
rhetoric that permeates the public debate on foreigners of African origin living in South Africa (McDonald, 
2000). 
The Violence of May 
Between 11 and 25 May 2008, 62 people, 20 of whom were South African nationals, died in 
Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and to a lesser extent, parts of the Free State and Eastern Cape.  
The wave of violence left 700 injured and it is estimated that at least 35, 000 African non-nationals were 
driven from their homes and displaced.  An un-estimated number of shacks and small businesses were 
burned down, and the belongings and properties of foreign nationals worth millions of rands were looted 
and dispossessed.  The reaction of the South African government was slow.  The eventual declaration of 
a national state of emergency and the deployment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
was too late to prevent the full brunt of violence being perpetrated (Nyar, 2010; Danso, 2001).  It drew 
disturbing parallels with the way in which difference was invoked by the apartheid government to justify 
violence, oppression and injustice.  The revival of the apartheid-derived term ‗black-on-black violence‘ 
invoked painful historical memories of the systematic devaluation and destruction of black lives under 
apartheid.  It was also a keen reminder that apartheid legacy-institutionalization of violence as a means of 
communicating grievances and achieving political leverage is still very much embedded within the 
national psyche (Nyar, 2010).   
Authorities in the field agree that it is xenophobia, and not any other form of semantics that is largely 
responsible for the violence (Everatt, 2011).  It is equally clear that the violence will recur.  Since May 
2008, xenophobic tensions have continued in its earlier form of sporadic, poorly reported acts of violence, 
though no less murderous.  Whether or not the violence of May was xenophobic, a point repeatedly 
rejected by then president Thabo Mbeki and most of his fellow ANC leaders, who insisted it was merely 
naked criminal activity, seems rather trite in the face of the murder, rape, injury, theft and displacement 
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that resulted (Everatt, 2010).  While the violence was mainly directed at foreign-born African migrants, 
victims also included ―shangaans‖ (term used to describe South Africans from Limpopo in particular, who 
failed linguistic tests such as knowing the isiZulu word for elbow; indololwane) (Everatt, 2010; Vromans, 
2011).   
Extensive research has been carried out on determining the immediate triggers behind the 
xenophobic violence of May 2008.  Researchers agree that to a significant degree, spiraling interest 
rates, frequent electricity blackouts, soaring oil/food prices, high unemployment, poor delivery of social 
services, and high crime rates all played at least some role in exacerbating the violence (Everatt, 2010).  
The structural characteristics of the violent outbreaks were the same: the aggressors were black insiders 
and they blamed their victims for crime, unemployment, the spread of HIV/AIDS and patronization of local 
women.  The significant difference between May 2008 and attacks previous and since is a matter of 
magnitude (Matsinhe, 2011).  South Africans savagely attacked foreigners, stole their goods, raped 
women, and behaved in every degrading way that they accused foreigners of doing (Everatt, 2010).  It is 
a common cause that despite remarkable achievements in some areas, despite social grants and free 
basic services, despite development programmes in virtually every sector, despite Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) and its follow up Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE), 
government has significantly failed to address inequality in South Africa (Everatt, 2010).   
In May 2008 South Africa‘s three largest cities of Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town were rocked 
by an explosion of xenophobic violence directed towards African non-nationals living in informal 
settlements, townships, suburbs, and central business districts (Peberdy, 2010).  Other cities and small 
towns in South African also saw attacks on foreigners.  Origins of the xenophobic violence can be traced 
back to the township of Alexandra, Johannesburg in late 1994 and early 1995 (Abrahams, 2010).  
Sporadic attacks, murders and displacement continued across the country until the violence of May 2008 
(Peberdy, 2010).  The random, unpredictable, unprovoked nature of everyday urban violence directed at 
foreign immigrants makes the xenophobic attacks all the more frightening (Murray, 2003).  The first 
substantial work to dissect the May 2008 violence was a volume published by the University of the 
Witwatersrand, following a colloquium on ―Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa ―, in late May 2008 
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(Everatt, 2011).  Results from these studies indicate that contributing factors to the xenophobic outburst 
include structural, social, economic and spatial inequalities as well as a general reliance on cheap labour, 
housing shortages, township retail competition, racism, a general history of violence to advance sectional 
interests and a scarred national psyche (Everatt, 2011).  There existed a seriously scarred national 
psyche in early 2008 due to, as mentioned before, poor service delivery, high interest rates, high costs of 
living, competition over Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing, corrupt government 
officials, and high unemployment rates (Everatt, 2011; Parsley, 2010). 
Researchers agree that it is not a matter of if violence on the scale of 2008 will reoccur, but when it 
will reoccur (Everatt, 2011).  Due to an active and vibrant civil society sector, South Africa has a basis of 
research, awareness and warnings on which it could have drawn to prepare for the outbreak of violence 
(Nyar, 2010).  Research organizations such as the Center for Policy Studies (CPS) and Institute for a 
Democratic South Africa (IDASA) had repeatedly warned of increasing xenophobic attitudes and the 
potential for attitudes to harden into violence.  The 2006 Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) 
Xenophobia Survey confirmed that in comparison to citizens of other countries worldwide, South Africans 
are the least open to outsiders and advocate the greatest restrictions on immigration.  67% of SAMP 
respondents indicated that African non- nationals use up resources, 49% believed that foreign nationals 
bring disease, and that they are responsible for high crime levels.  84% felt that South Africa is allowing 
―too many‖ African non-nationals into the country and consequently that they should not be accorded any 
rights or protection from the state (Nyar, 2010). 
The dynamics of the May 2008 attacks were such that it was able to spread rapidly across various 
geographical areas and provincial borders.  It quickly migrated from Gauteng to other provinces such as 
Kwa-Zulu Natal, Eastern Cape and the Western Cape, and to a lesser extent, the Free State, North West 
and Limpopo Province.  The xenophobic attacks of 2008 denoted a marked difference in scale, for which 






III.  STUDY SITE 
South Africa is administratively divided into nine provinces (Figure 9.), and further divided into 53 
districts (47 district municipalities and 6 metropolitan districts).  These districts are then divided into 248 
local municipalities.  The nine provinces vary in a number of ways.  The Western Cape has the highest 
human development index (HDI) followed by Gauteng, while the ten most deprived districts in 2007/2008 
were located in KwaZulu-Natal (6), Eastern Cape (3) and Limpopo (1) that are all classified as rural 
development districts.  Conversely, all districts within the Western Cape were classified as the least 
deprived as were three of the six metros, namely the City of Cape Town and Nelson Mandela metro 
(Eastern Cape) and the City of Johannesburg (Gauteng) (Sartorius, 2011).   
 
Figure 9. The Nine Provinces of the Republic of South Africa. 
The location of the xenophobic attacks of May 2008 (Figure 10.) tended to be located in poor urban 
neighborhoods and informal settlements in different parts of South Africa where foreign nationals and 
South African citizens lived in mixed communities and in close proximity to each other (Nyar, 2010).  After 
1994, urban spaces became re-defined by dual processes of rapid and sustained migratory streams of 
foreign nationals entering South Africa.  Such migratory streams included sustained numbers fleeing 
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political turmoil in neighboring Zimbabwe.  Rural-based black South Africans also constituted part of the 
influx to cities in search of jobs and improved economic opportunities and prospects.  The presence of 
large numbers of African non-nationals living in close proximity to poor South Africans in squalid and 
congested urban living spaces has had the effect of breeding extreme social discontent (Nyar, 2010). 
 
Figure 10. Locations of Xenophobic Violence, January – July 2008 (Everatt, 2010) 
Johannesburg 
South Africa is in the top three most unequal countries on earth, and Johannesburg among the most 
unequal cities on earth, joined by Pretoria (Everatt, 2010).  On the whole, cities remain spatially divided 
and black poor and working class still living in geographically marginalized and peripheral areas of the 
city which are under-serviced and marked by high levels of unemployment, poverty, economic 
marginalization and social crises (Peberdy, 2010).  In many South African cities, migrants face many 
difficulties ranging from discrimination and prejudice to outright violence and intimidation, but the 
epicenter of anti-immigrant xenophobia is the Greater Johannesburg metropolitan region.  Like similar 
cities, Johannesburg has become a magnet for ―bi-polar migration‖, drawing into its orbit large groups of 
individuals in the survivalist enterprise (Murray, 2003).  The hostility and violence directed at foreign 
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immigrants is an integral feature of everyday life in the Johannesburg metropolitan region.  It is difficult to 
investigate the poor treatment of immigrants however, because the available evidence consists largely of 
anecdotal, sketchy stories sensationalized in newspaper accounts or passed on in urban legend (Murray, 
2003).   
21 key urban areas of the country contribute 70% of the national economy.  Johannesburg is the only 
city in South Africa to be classified as a world city.  Whereas Cape Town and Durban are port cities key to 
South African trade, Johannesburg serves as an economic and trade hub for the country and region 
(Peberdy, 2010).  In 2001, some 56% of South Africa‘s population was found to live in cities.  
Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban along with Ekurhuleni and Tshwane (Pretoria) are the country‘s 
core urban regions (Peberdy, 2010).  There has been a significant increase in the rate of urbanization 
since the early 90‘s as racial restrictions on movement and residence were lifted.  Today, internal 
migration is a key feature of the population growth of cities such as Johannesburg (Peberdy, 2010).  
Despite being sites of wealth creation, South Africa‘s cities are also sites of great inequality and poverty, 
the official unemployment rate for all cities averaging over 25% in 2001 (Peberdy, 2010). 
The inception of the xenophobic attacks in Alexandra is critical in terms of explicating an 
understanding of the anomalous nature of the violence.  Alexandra is a well-established township with a 
history of sheltering migrants and immigrants.  It is also historically well known as a stronghold of civic 
activism and radical democratic politics.  However, Alexandra was unable to contain high levels of 
frustration and discontent over living conditions from boiling over into unrestrained violence against 
foreign nationals living in the township alongside South African citizens (Nyar, 2010).  The violence was 
characterized by weapons used such as pangas (a type of axe), machetes, petrol bombs, bricks and 
stones, as well as the violence committed such as murder, beatings, burnings, rape, theft and looting 
(Nyar, 2010).   
Cape Town 
In Cape Town in 2006 an estimated 22% of all households lived in informal dwellings, including 
almost 60% of the city‘s black households (37% in informal settlements and 22% in backyards) and 7% of 
Coloured households (2% in informal settlements).  Some 18% of Cape Town‘s households lived in 
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overcrowded conditions (29% of black and 21% of Coloured).  South African cities are also facing social 
crises.  Health care is a particular problem for cities.  HIV prevalence rates in South Africa are amongst 
the highest in the world, in part because the high rate of circular migration within the country creates 
conditions which encourage the spread of the virus.  HIV prevalence rates from antenatal clinics in 2006 
were 17% in Cape Town, 32% in Johannesburg, and 42% in Durban (Peberdy, 2010).  Communities 
situated within urban areas of the country, particularly those on the periphery, also face challenges of 
crime and violence, some of which is related to drug use (Peberdy, 2010).   
Following the lifting of the ―Coloured Preference Area‖ between 1985 and 2005 the black population 
of the city of Cape Town increased from less than 200,000 to over one million (Peberdy, 2010).  Under 
apartheid, the legal status of black South Africans, particularly in the Western Cape, was little different 
from that of African people who entered the country illegally from beyond South Africa‘s borders.  They 
were effectively foreigners in their own land (Dodson, 2000).  The rapid influx of both African non-
nationals as well as Black South African nationals into the Cape over the past two decades has caused 
extremes on both sides of the socioeconomic divide to be brought together.  This has in many ways lead 
to tensions between groups living in the area.  One of several places to have experienced such conflict is 
Mizamoyethu, an informal settlement located in Hout Bay, Cape Town.   
Practically since its inception in 1991, Mizamoyethu has seen tension between South African 
nationals and foreign-national residents (Dodson, 2000).  Residents of Mizamoyethu compete not in 
some abstract economic sense, but directly for the very same jobs, undercutting each other in wage 
bargaining for work on the same fishing boats and beating the same streets seeking employment in the 
houses and gardens of their wealthy white neighbors (Dodson, 2000).  Lacking either skills or capital, and 
with only limited social support networks, their position in the urban system is both highly precarious and 
jealously guarded (Dodson, 2000).  Feelings of resentment and envy towards even these limited levels of 
economic well-being are hardly surprising in themselves, and are exacerbated by the perception that 
foreigners have ―stolen‖ something from South Africans.  Such material differences, and the structural 
forces which underpin them, are the primary source of tension in the community (Dodson, 2000).  
Certainly, some of the foreign respondents could afford to live in more formal settlements, but widespread 
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hostility towards foreigners and the lack of clarity about their residence status in South Africa may 
preclude, or at least discourage, them from entering the formal property market elsewhere in Cape Town.  
For those without official residence status in the country, places like Mizamoyethu are also relatively easy 
places in which to be invisible form the authorities (Dodson, 2000). 
Durban 
Durban is intimately linked to the history of Zulu identity and class formation, to the making of 
segregation and to regional popular protest (Freund, 2001).  African men came to labour in Durban, 
particularly in the transport sector and in the homes of settlers.  In addition, a large population of Indians 
lived in Durban.  Although indentured workers were brought to Natal from 1860 to work in the sugar fields, 
a significant and growing percentage were involved in other economic activities, for instance the Natal 
Railways.  A large barracks housed hundreds of Indian families on the edge of the city centre to serve the 
railways while many gathered around Durban where they reconstituted Indian family life and were able to 
combine employment (increasingly, from the 1920s, industrial employment) with fishing, farming, 
commercial and artisanal activity (Freund, 2001).  The reasons for the Indian presence on the edge of 
Durban were twofold: it was an attraction for many to live on land where non-wage sources of income 
could be practiced, and the living was cheap and relatively uncontrolled by the state, by the 1920s, it had 
become very difficult for Indians to buy houses or land in areas of town that whites had staked out for 
themselves (Freund, 2001).  As Swanson pointed out, moreover, the problems for Indian merchants were 
even greater due to the biased local and state‘s command of licensing rights (Freund, 2001). 
Moreover, segregation, while increasingly enshrined in national legislation, was not an entirely 
practicable policy financially.  Voluntary immigration supplied the fuel for industrialization in Durban; 
therefore, it would not be financially viable to completely segregate (Freund, 2001).  The state operated 
on the theory that races were naturally antagonistic to each other and needed to be separated in the 
interests of peace, with neutral zones between them (Freund, 2001).  In fact, white commercial and 
residential flight was a notable feature.  The city has, in part for this reason, become increasingly 
―decentered‖ (Freund, 2001).   
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The rapid rate of urbanization in South African cities like Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban 
since the early 90s indicates that the challenge to provide services to its population grows as the state 
tries to keep up with new arrivals.  However, poverty, inequality, lack of services and lack of adequate 
housing are not reasons to attack people for who they are and for the citizenship they hold (Peberdy, 
2010).  Figure 11. represents the total access to services across the three large urban centres of Cape 
Town, Durban, and Johannesburg respectively.  
 





























IV.  METHODOLOGY 
Given the lack of vital registration data and the inability of migration surveys to yield reliable estimates 
of the total number of migrants, censuses remain an adequate source of data for painting a picture of 
internal and international population movements in and across African societies (Zuberi, 2004).  This 
statement holds especially true in the context of monitoring the relationships between South African 
nationals and non-nationals.  This approach has been duplicated across many fields by many 
researchers involved in area studies research (Weeks, 2004).  The task of planning and implementing 
censuses in South Africa is the responsibility of Statistics South Africa (STATSSA).     
Geospatial analysis is an important tool used in human geographic research to detect possible 
sources of heterogeneity, spatial incidence or patterns (Sartorius, 2011).  The potential of spatial analysis 
is reinforced by the increasing availability of geographically indexed population level data, as well as 
advances in computation methods using GIS systems.  Spatial analysis, moreover, can be applied to 
census data in small area studies, as well as to imperfect data, often the case in Africa, through the use 
of space and time geo-statistics (Sartorius, 2011).   
Community Survey 2007 
All demographic data used during this research was provided by the 2007 Community Survey.  
STATSSA is mandated by law, in terms of Stats Act No. 6 of 1999, to collect reliable statistical information 
from the public, which informs development and democracy in the country.  STATSSA conducts the 
Population Census, and several other household-based surveys such as the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
and the General Household Survey (GHS) on an ongoing basis.  Until recently, South Africa collected 
census information from the public every five years.  As such, the previous two censuses undertaken in 
1996 and 2001 generated diverse geographic and socio-economic information that provided insight into 
the performance of government programs.  This provision of information collected through these two 
censuses has also inspired high expectations from data users regarding the availability of statistics at a 
high geographic resolution.  In 2001, parliament decided to have the census take a ten-year cycle with a 
large-scale household survey being undertaken in 2007.  Community Survey 2007 (CS 2007) is the name 
of the mini census and is the first of its kind in the country.  The purpose of the survey is to collect 
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information on the trends and level of demographic and socio-economic data; the extent of poor 
households; access to facilities and services; levels of employment and unemployment; in order to assist 
government and private sector in planning, evaluating and monitoring programs and policies.  CS 2007 is 
not only a measure of development trajectory that South Africa has undertaken since 1994, it is also 
intended to elevate difficult questions around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United 
Nations for which South Africa has committed itself to achieving since the 1990s.  In CS 2007, 949, 105 
persons were enumerated and 246, 618 households were covered during the enumeration, with a 
response rate of 93.9%.  The survey randomly sampled enumeration areas (EA) and then dwelling units 
within each EA.  An EA is the smallest geographical unit (piece of land) into which the country is divided 
for enumeration purposes.  Enumeration areas contain between 100 to 250 households.  The survey was 
conducted between February 7
th
 and February 28
th
, 2007 (Community Survey 2007 Basic Results).  CS 
2007 results were released on 24 October 2007.  After the evaluation of the data by the Stats Council, CS 
2007 was found to be comparable in many aspects with other STATSSA surveys, censuses and other 
external sources. 
The South African Statistics Council found the reported demographic data to be entirely plausible 
when compared to other censuses.  Certain limitations and potential errors were identified by STATSSA 
and the South African Statistics Council when reviewing the survey, however the following systematic 
errors were observed in the data: underestimate of men relative to women, underestimate of children 
younger than 10 years, excess of people aged 10-24 in Western Cape and Gauteng, and deficit of 
women aged 20-34 in Free State, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo.     
Scale and Geographic Hierarchy of Data 
The spatial version of local municipality, district municipality and provincial boundaries used in CS 
2007, is the December 2005 version as released by the Municipal Demarcation Board in January 2006.  
All municipal name and code changes as implemented since the December 2005 release were 
incorporated.  In total, there are six (6) metropolitan municipalities, forty-six (46) district municipalities, two 
hundred and thirty one (231) local municipalities, and twenty (20) district management areas.  Figure 12 




Figure 12. Geographical hierarchy for Community Survey 2007. 
Two spatial scales were used for analysis operations for this research.  Analysis of geospatial and 
socioeconomic trends at the provincial level utilized data at Level 2 (province).  All grievances and 
opportunities were mapped at a scale of Level 2.  EA units at this scale included all nine (9) provinces of 
South Africa.  Further analysis was carried out at a scale of Level 3 (metropolitan + district municipalities) 
when datasets representing grievances and opportunities at this scale were available from CS 2007.  EA 
units at Level 3 included the six (6) metropolitan municipalities as well as the forty-six (46) district 
municipalities for a combined total of 52 Level 3 EA units.  Spatial analysis for datasets at a scale of Level 
2 resulted in a series of quantitative thematic maps.  No further statistical analysis was carried out at this 
scale.  However, datasets that were available from CS 2007 at a scale of Level 3 allowed for further 
statistical analysis.  This is due to the fact that there are only 9 EA units at a scale of Level 2.  Statistical 
analysis at this scale would not produce statistically significant relationships amongst features.  There are 
52 EA units at a scale of Level 3, thus producing a stronger series of statistically significant relationships 
amongst features.      
Data Source and Projection 
The two main sources of data used to carry out this research were CS 2007 for all demographic and 
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socioeconomic data and Map Library (www.maplibrary.org/Africa), an open source data clearinghouse 
containing administrative boundaries for South Africa‘s provinces and municipalities.  A national shapefile 
of the study area was created by downloading the 52 Level 3 EA and 9 Level 2 EA units as individual 
shapefiles directly from Map Library.  The entire dataset has been reviewed and updated to reflect 
administrative boundaries as per January, 2007.  This is temporally consistent with data obtained from 
CS 2007.  The national shapefile was then imported into a file geodatabase using ArcGIS Desktop 10.0 to 
create the necessary areal and geospatial data for analysis (Figure 13.). 
 
Figure 13. Creating file geodatabase, Ubuntu. 
The selected geographic coordinate system used during analysis operations was the global world 
geodetic system, WGS_1984_EASE_Grid_Global.  This coordinate system was used for each analysis 
operation to maintain the integrity of spatial data.  The projection selected was a cylindrical equal area 
projection as equal area projections are best used in analysis of quantitative attributes by area. 
Grievance and Opportunity Mapped 
In order to geospatially represent the propensity for xenophobic violence within urban areas across 
South Africa, the five major grievances South African nationals have voiced in response to immigration 
were mapped, creating a serious of grievance maps.  The grievances are categorized as follows: 1) 
competition for jobs, 2) competition for women, 3) spread of disease, 4) spread of crime, and 5) poor 
service delivery from the government.  Each grievance contains unique datasets obtained from CS 2007. 
1. Competition for Jobs 
The competition for jobs grievance was represented by unemployment rates by province (Level 2) 
and municipality (Level 3).  The following datasets were selected from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) as 
inputs to a file geodatabase to best represent this grievance: 
a. Unemployment Status 
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According to the official unemployment definition, a person must satisfy the following three conditions: 
1) the person did not work during the seven days prior to the survey interview, and does not have any job 
attachment, 2) the person wants to work and is available to start work within two weeks, and 3) the 
person has taken active steps to look for work or to start a business in the four weeks prior to the 
interview (cite).  The universe included each person aged 15-65 who usually resided in the household for 
at least four nights a week and had done so for the past four weeks, and any other person who stayed 
over the previous night as a visitor.  Respondents could answer one of the four following ways: 1) 
Employed, 2) Unemployed, 3) Not economically active, and 4) Unspecified.  The following equation was 




)       , where   = unemployment rate,   = total no. unemployed,   = labour force 
Once the unemployment rates were calculated, a choropleth map was produced to spatially represent 
unemployment rates per EA unit.   
2. Competition for Women 
The second grievance is that non-nationals take away women meant for South African nationals.  The 
competition for women grievance was calculated by comparing the ratio of black South African women 
with the ratios of unmarried individuals and immigrants.  Representing this grievance was accomplished 
by obtaining census data from the Family Survey (FS).  This database contains data on marital status and 
relationship to the head of household.  Data was obtained at both scales; Level 2 and Level 3.  The 
following datasets were used: 
a. Gender and Population Group 
The four population groups in South Africa are: 1) Black, 2) Coloured, 3) Indian or Asian, and 4) 
White.  Because the majority of grievances made towards African non-nationals are by black South 
African nationals, the percentages of black women were calculated per total number of women living in an 
EA unit at Level 2 and Level 3 scales, thus normalizing the data.  The output would be a spatial 
representation of the distribution of black women across the country, represented through a series of 
choropleth maps. 
b. Married Status 
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This question was asked to determine the marital status of the members of a household.  Table 1 



















Table 1. Marital Status 
A category of ―not married‖ (NM) was created from the following equation: 
             
The rate of NM (R) was calculated as follows: 
  (
  
     
)       
A series of choropleth maps were then created to represent the spatial distribution of individuals ―not 
married‖ across the country.  As those who are not married are more likely to seek partnership with other 
single ―not married‖ individuals, this analysis was significant in measuring this grievance. 
c. Province of Previous Residence 
This question was asked to determine from which province each person had moved since 2001.  If 
the move was from another country, ―Outside RSA was recorded‖ (Community Survey, 2007).  The 













Gauteng Mpumalanga Limpopo 
Outside 
RSA 
Table 2. Province of Previous Residence 
As reliable data on immigration is incredibly difficult to obtain (or non-existent), the above data were used 
to create a sense of movement of people within the country.  Of particular interest was the number of 
persons who had migrated from outside South Africa (Outside RSA) since 2001.  Data was disregarded 
for every respondent that had not moved from a previous province since 2001.  A series of choropleth 
maps was created as outputs to represent the numbers of ―immigrants‖ per each EA unit at Level 2 and 
Level 3 scales.   
3. Spread of Disease 
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With the geographic patterns of the spread of HIV/AIDS, it has become very easy for most South 
Africans to view the disease as a ―black peril‖ from other countries (Chirwa, 1998).  It is believed by many 
that African non-nationals entering the country legally or illegally bring with them various diseases, 
particularly sexually-transmitted diseases.  The spread of disease grievance was calculated by comparing 
the reported rates of cause of death from disease for 2007 with the total number of reported deaths for 
the same year.  In order to map this grievance, the following dataset was obtained from CS 2007‘s Cause 
of death from death notification 2007 survey: 
a. Cause of Death from Disease 
The cause of death from disease was broken into six categories within the survey: 1) immediate 
cause of death, 2) second condition leading to death, 3) third condition leading to death, 4) fourth 
condition leading to death, 5) other conditions leading to death, and 6) underlying cause of death.  Each 
category included the individual diseases that caused death.  The total numbers of death per each 
disease were then added together across all six categories to create a list of total causes of death due to 
disease per province.  The following table (Table 3) lists the different types of disease responsible for 
cause of death in 2007: 
Tuberculosis (of respiratory, nervous system, 
other organs) 
Syphilis (congenital, late, other) 
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) Gonococcal infection 
Granuloma inguinale Trichomoniasis 
Herpes simplex 
Other predominantly STD; not elsewhere 
classified 
Chlamydial lymphogranuloma (venereum) Unspecified STD 
Other sexually transmitted chlamydial diseases  
Table 3. Cause of Death from Disease Type 
This dataset was only available at a scale of Level 2.  Cause of death from disease rates were calculated 
by dividing the total number of cause of death from disease by the total number of cause of death per 
each EA unit (province).  The output would be a spatial distribution of the reported cause of death rates 
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from disease per EA unit (province). 
4. Spread of Crime 
There is a commonly held belief that African non-nationals exacerbate crime rates as they travel 
through areas of the country.  The spread of crime grievance was calculated using reported death rates 
from assault and reported rates of individuals being sexually assaulted, beaten up, harassed, or 
burglarized by someone outside of the household in 2007.  All datasets used to map this grievance were 
obtained from a scale of Level 2 (province).  In order to map this grievance, the following datasets were 
obtained from CS 2007: 
a. Cause of Death from Assault 
Data was obtained from CS 2007‘s ―Mortality and causes of death from death notification 2007‖ 
survey.  Death from assault numbers included any of the following listed cause of death from assault 
categories (Table 4): 




Hit/struck by another 
person 
Striking 










Witch doctor enema 
Table 4. Cause of Death by Assault Category 
The data was collected and then normalized against the total reported number of cause of death per 
province in order to produce cause of death by assault rates across the study area.  Three additional 
crime-related categories were created from which data was available from CS 2007.  Each of these 
categories, as well as cause of death from assault, were spatially represented in order to effectively map 
the alleged grievance that African non-nationals are responsible for a general feeling of vulnerability felt 
by many South African nationals. 
b. Been beaten up by someone outside the household 
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Data was obtained from the GHS.  Respondents from each province answered one of either YES, NO 
or Unspecified.  To spatially represent the rates of persons that had been beaten up by someone outside 
the household ( ) in 2007, the following equation was used: 
  (
   
     
)      
c. Been harassed by someone outside the household 
Data was obtained from the GHS.  Respondents from each province answered one of either YES, NO 
or Unspecified.  To spatially represent the rates of persons harassed by someone outside the household 
( ) in 2007, the following equation was used: 
  (
   
     
)      
d. Been sexually assaulted by someone outside the household 
Data was obtained from the GHS.  Respondents from each province answered one of either YES, NO 
or Unspecified.  To spatially represent the rates of persons sexually assaulted by someone outside the 
household ( ) in 2007, the following equation was used: 
  (
   
     
)      
e. Had something stolen by someone outside the household 
Data was obtained from the GHS.  Respondents from each province answered one of either YES, NO 
or Unspecified.  To spatially represent the rates of theft     in 2007, the following equation was used: 
  (
   
     
)      
Each of these five datasets were represented as a series of choropleth maps. 
5. Poor Service Delivery (from government) 
The final grievance used in this study was one that is voiced by the majority of the country; the 
ineffective service provisions made by the government for all people living in South Africa.  The poor 
service delivery grievance was calculated using three datasets: percentages of individuals without access 
to piped water within the household, percentages of individuals without access to land, and percentages 
of individuals without an electricity mains supply within the household during 2007.  The datasets were 
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obtained from the GHS and were only available at a scale of Level 2 (province).  In order to map this 
grievance the following datasets were selected from the GHS to represent this grievance. 
a. Access to piped water within the household 
This question was asked to determine the accessibility of a basic resource that should be provided by 
the government, water; water for drinking, cleaning, and washing.  To spatially represent the distribution 
of persons without access to piped water     in 2007, the following equation was used: 
  (
  
     
)      
b. Access to land  
Competition over land has been a major source of contention between South African nationals and 
immigrating communities of African non-nationals.  Determining the spatial distribution of the accessibility 
of land would prove beneficial in determining the extent of this grievance.  To spatially represent the 
distribution of persons without access to land     in 2007, the following equation was used: 
  (
  
     
)      
c. Main electricity supply at household 
It has been documented that one underlying trigger to the mass violence of 2008 was frequency of 
electricity blackouts, an indicator of poor service delivery (Everatt, 2010).  To spatially represent the 
distribution of persons without a main electricity supply     in 2007, the following equation was used: 
  (
  
     
)      
A series of choropleth maps were created to represent this grievance. 
The Grievance Maps geospatially represent motives for conflict and they are driven by how one group 
perceives another.  These maps attempt to show that motives for conflict in South Africa are driven by the 
relative deprivation of one group, Black South African nationals. 
Opportunity Maps 
In addition to the presence of group grievances, there must also exist an opportunity for violence.  
Grievances alone rarely lead to the type of violence that occurred in South Africa between May and July 
of 2008.  The Opportunity Maps answer the question of identifying what structural conditions exist that 
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provides opportunities for South African nationals to respond to the presence of non-nationals through 
violent means.  Because the opportunity-oriented tradition towards conflict has its roots in economic 
theory, datasets were selected from CS 2007 and the GHS to represent measurable economic factors 
that could influence the opportunity of conflict in South Africa. 
1. Youth Bulge 
Data representing the labour force was obtained from the LFS at scales of Level 2 (province) and 
Level 3 (municipality).  This database only covers people of working age (15-65 years of age), whether 
economically active or not.  Data representing youth bulges (15-24 years of age) was obtained from CS 
2007.  A youth bulge is determined by the total number of youth aged 15-24     divided by the total adult 





)     
A series of choropleth maps were created to represent this grievance. 
2. Poverty 
Four socioeconomic factors were chosen from the GHS to represent this opportunity.  The first three 
datasets covered a scale of Level 2 (province) only.  Data was not available for these datasets at a scale 
of Level 3 (municipality).  The last dataset, monthly income category was available at a scale of Level 2 
(province) and Level 3 (municipality).  The following datasets were selected to represent this opportunity: 
a. Children living on the streets 
Children living on streets indicate that there is a fundamental breakdown in government provisions for 
its people.  To spatially represent the distribution of the number of children living on streets     in 2007, 
the following equation was used: 
  (
   
     
)      
b. Have a car 
Car ownership was selected to represent an indicator of relative wealth.  To spatially represent the 




   
     
)      
c. Can‘t afford water 
To spatially represent the distribution of individuals who cannot afford water     in 2007, the 
following equation was used: 
  (
   
     
)      
d. Monthly Income Category (MIC) 
This dataset was used to determine the income category that best describes the gross monthly 
income before deductions and includes all sources of income.  Due to the availability of the data at scale, 
MIC data was represented at both Level 2 (province) and Level 3 (municipality) scales.  Table 5 
represents the different classifications of this dataset: 
No Income 
R1 - R400 
R401 – R800 
R801 – R1600 
R1601 – R3200 
R3201 – R6400 
R6401 – R12800 
R12801 – R25600 
R25601 – R51200 
R51201 – R102400 
R102401 – R204800 
R204801 or more 
Table 5. Monthly Income Categories 
Prior research has shown that the food poverty line across South Africa was found to be R211 per capita 
per month (in 2000 prices) (Woolard & Leibbrandt, 2006).  Directly from this research, STATSSA derived 
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a ―lower bound‖ poverty line of R322 per capita per month and an ―upper bound‖ poverty line of R593 per 
capita per month (in 2000 prices).  The STATSSA ―upper bound‖ was calculated by observing the total 
consumption spending of households that spend R211 per capita on food.  STATSSA found that 
households that spent approximately R211 per capita per month on food had an average per capita 
expenditure level of R593 (R211 on food and R382 on non-food items).  This is the ―traditional‖ cost of 
basic needs approach to determining the non-food component of the poverty line (Woolard & Leibbrandt, 
2006).  For the purposes of this study, the ―upper bound‖ poverty line was raised to include the categories 
of ―no income‖, ―R1-R400‖, and ―R401-R800‖ due to the availability of the census data at this category.  A 
Modified Poverty Rate       can then be calculated by dividing the combination of respondents 
representing the ―no income‖ and ―R1-R800‖ by the total number of respondents        .  The following 
equation represents the calculation: 
    (
                 
     
)        
A series of choropleth maps were created to spatially represent this opportunity. 
Spatial Autocorrelation in GIS 
Once the grievances and opportunities were mapped, spatial statistical analyses were carried out to 
determine if the spatial distribution of values per grievance and opportunity (high or low) were statistically 
significant across the study area and therefore worth further investigation.  To identify hot spots or 
clustering of data values per grievance, the ESRI Hot Spot Analysis (Getis-Ord Gi*) statistical tool (Figure 
14) was used.   
 
Figure 14. ESRI Hot Spot Analysis (Getis-Ord Gi*) Model. 
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In each case, the tool tested to see if there were hot or cold spots of a grievance or opportunity 
surrounded by hot or cold spots of the same grievance or opportunity.  Prior to running the analysis, the 
appropriate conceptualization of spatial relationships was determined.  Choosing the correct 
conceptualization of spatial relationships was vital in testing the interaction between features and any 
shared commonality amongst neighboring features.  The zone of indifference conceptualization of spatial 
relationships was chosen so that features that fell outside of a critical distance would be weighted 
appropriately and included in the analysis.  The final necessary step taken before running the analysis 
was to select an appropriate distance band.  The distance needed to match the scale of the field of study 
and needed to result in every feature having at least several neighbors (ArcGIS Resource Center).  
Selecting a distance band that is too small would result in the features not having enough neighbors, 
therefore resulting in unwanted results.  To select the appropriate distance band, the Spatial 
Autocorrelation (Morans I) tool (Figure 15) was used.   
 
Figure 15. ESRI Spatial Autocorrelation (Morans I) Model. 
Once run, this tool provides as an output a Z-score for the entire study area at that specific distance band 
(ESRI Resources).  The inputs and conceptualization of spatial relationships are the same as the Hot 
Spot Analysis tool for each grievance and opportunity.  The smallest distance that is at a scale consistent 
with the study area was determined to be 15,000m (15km).  The Z score created as an output is a 
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measure of how clustered the values are (Figure 16).  To determine the most appropriate distance band 
to use for this study area, the tool was run 31 times at 15,000m intervals until reaching a distance band of 
450,000m (450km).  The value of 450,000m was selected because any distance greater would result in 
the loss of subtle differences between districts.  Each distance and Z-score value was added to a table, 
and then imported into ArcMap.  The Z-scores were then graphed (Figure 17), showing the global Z-score 
values for the 31 distance bands.  Due to the large spatial extent of the study area, a distance band of 
250,000m (250km) was selected.  This method allows the data to determine the most appropriate 
distance band to use in the analysis. 
 




Figure 17. Selecting an Appropriate Distance Band. 
Once the distance band was selected, hot spot analyses were conducted for the following grievances at a 
scale of Level 3: 1) stealing jobs, 2) stealing women, and for the following opportunities: 1) youth bulge, 2) 
poverty. 
Predictive Modeling using Regression Analysis 
Mapping clusters of high and low data values identifies where statistically significant spatial 
relationships occur across the study area.  To determine how these relationships influence xenophobic 
violence requires modeling the spatial relationships.  The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) tool was used to 
answer this question (Figure 18).  The OLS tool served as a predictive model to illustrate the degree of 




Figure 18. ESRI Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model. 
The greatest challenge in OLS modeling is finding the appropriate set of explanatory variables that help to 
best support the dependent variable.  Exploratory Regression Analysis, an effective method in 
determining accurate explanatory variables, was used to identify which grievances and opportunities are 
most likely to support the OLS model (Figure 29).   
 
Figure 19. Exploratory Regression Model (ERM) 
In order to better understand the relationships between the grievances and opportunities with the 
locations of the 2008 xenophobic violence, an OLS regression equation is used to serve as a global 
model of the variable that is being predicted (ESRI Resources).  The following OLS regression equation 
was used: 
     0 +  1X1 +  2X2 + …….  nXn +  ,  




Exploratory regression models every possible combination of variables, in an attempt to create a 
regression model that best supports the assumptions of the OLS equation.  Previous research indicates 
that grievances and opportunities (unemployment rates, modified poverty rates, distribution of black 
women, singleness, distribution of foreigners, and youth bulge) are substantial candidates for this model.  
The dependent variable in this case represents the 74 event locations of xenophobic violence that 
occurred across the country from May – July of 2008.  The event locations are a function of the 
explanatory variables.  The explanatory variables are represented by the grievances and opportunities.  
Coefficients represent the degree to which each explanatory variable influences the dependent variable 
(directly or indirectly).   
The 2008 violence event locations were aggregated from their point data source into a feature class 
that contained the grievance and opportunity data, resulting in both dependent and independent variables 
stored together in the same dataset.  After selecting the appropriate independent variables, the OLS tool 
was run producing a thematic map of the study area that represented the predictive strength of the model 
to relate the independent variables (grievances and opportunities) with the dependent variable (locations 
of 2008 violence).  In order to ensure the reliability of the OLS model, the residuals produced from 
running the OLS diagnostic were checked for correlation using the ESRI Spatial Autocorrelation (Morans 
I) tool.  Running this tool at the end of the analysis process would reveal the degree of correlation 












V.  RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
Grievance Maps 
1. Competition for Jobs 
The distribution of unemployment rates in 2007 was represented at two spatial scales, Level 2 
(province) and Level 3 (municipality).  Unemployment rates at Level 2 (province) contained five 
classifications, ranging from a low of 19.15% to a high of 24.74% (Figure 20).   
 
Figure 20. Spatial Distribution of Unemployment Rates by Province, 2007. 
The analysis indicates that the nation‘s highest unemployment rates are concentrated in the central to 
north central and eastern parts of the country.  The North West, Free State and Gauteng experienced the 
highest unemployment rates (23.95% – 24.74%).  KwaZulu-Natal had an unemployment rate of 22.93% - 
23.94%.  The Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga contained unemployment rates of 21.65% - 22.92%).  The 
Northern Cape and Limpopo contained unemployment rates of 19.16% - 21.64%) and the Western Cape 
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had the lowest unemployment rates of 19.15%.  The Western Cape contains three municipalities 
representing the lowest unemployment rates (15.18% - 17.37%), two municipalities with rates of 17.38% - 
20.76%), and one municipality with rates of 20.77% - 22.90%.  The Northern Cape contains one 
municipality representing the lowest unemployment rates (15.18% - 17.37%), two municipalities with rates 
of 17.38% - 20.76%, one municipality with rates of 20.77% - 22.90%, and one municipality with rates of 
22.91% - 26.16%.  The Free State contains two municipalities with rates of 20.77% - 22.90%, two 
municipalities with rates of 22.91% - 26.16%, and one municipality with rates of 26.17 – 30.34%.  The 
North West province contains one municipality with rates of 17.38% - 20.76%, one municipality with rates 
of 20.77% - 22.90%, one municipality with rates of 22.91% - 26.16%, and one municipality with rates of 
26.17% - 30.34%. 
Gauteng province contains three municipalities with rates of 20.77% - 22.90%, two municipalities with 
rates of 22.91% - 26.16%, and one municipality with rates of 26.17% - 30.34%.  Limpopo province 
contains one municipality with rates of 17.38% - 20.76%, three municipalities with rates of 20.77% - 
22.90%, and one municipality with rates of 22.91% - 26.16%.  Mpumalanga contains two municipalities 
with rates of 20.77% - 22.90% and one municipality with rates of 22.91% - 26.16%.  KwaZulu-Natal 
contains one municipality with rates of 15.18% - 17.37%, two municipalities with rates of 17.38% - 
20.76%, one municipality with rates of 20.77% - 22.90%, five municipalities with rates of 22.91% - 
26.16%, and two municipalities with rates of 26.17% - 30.34%.  The Eastern Cape contains one 
municipality with rate of 15.18% - 17.37%, one municipality with rates of 17.38% - 20.76%, one 
municipality with rates of 20.77% - 22.90%, two municipalities with rates of 22.91% - 26.16%, and two 




Figure 21. Spatial Distribution of Unemployment Rates by Municipality, 2007 
Results from running the Hot Spot Analysis tool on unemployment rates at a scale of Level 3 
produces a feature class that is symbolized to reveal hot spots and cold spots across the dataset.  A hot 
spot (red) symbolizes a statistically significant cluster of high values and a cold spot (blue) symbolizes a 
statistically significant cluster of low values.  Figure 22 represents the hot spot analysis for unemployment 
rates at a scale of Level 3, indicating that significant clustering of high unemployment rates occurs in an 
easily discernible band stretching from the eastern half of the North West province heading in a 
southeasterly direction, through Gauteng, western Mpumalanga, eastern Free State and finally finishing 
in central KwaZulu-Natal.  There is also significant clustering of high values in western Eastern Cape.  
Conversely, significant clustering of low values occurs in the far west of the country, specifically in the 




Figure 22. Hot Spot Analysis of Unemployment Rates, 2007. 
2. Competition for Women 
A series of quantitative thematic maps was produced to identify the spatial distribution of women by 
population group across the country per municipality, particularly the spatial distribution of black women 
(Figure 23.a).  Figure 24 represents the spatial distribution of women by population group at a scale of 
Level 2 (province).  Figures 25 and 26 complete the grievance by representing the spatial distribution of 
singleness and immigrants respectively at both spatial scales.  Both figures 23 and 24 reveal that the 
spatial distribution of black women are concentrated in the eastern and northeastern parts of the country.  
Conversely, the concentration of coloured women are concentrated in the south and southwestern parts 
of the country.  The concentration of Indian/Asian women are mostly found in KwaZulu-Natal, with some 
significant numbers located in the country‘s metropolitan regions of Johannesburg in Gauteng province 
and Cape Town in the Western Cape (Figure 23).  Finally, the concentration of white women are more 
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evenly distrubuted across the country with significant concentrations associated with the large urban 
areas of Cape Town (Western Cape), Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape), Johnnesburg and Pretoria 
(Gauteng), Durban (KwaZulu-Natal), Bloemfontein (Free State), and Kimberley (Northern Cape).  
Figure 25 indicates that the higher rates of individuals who are not traditionally married are located in 
the northeastern and easternmost regions of the country.  Conversely, the central and southwesternmost 













 a) Black 
      b) Coloured 
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           c) Indian/Asian 
d) White 








          c) Indian/Asian 
d) White 
Figure 24. Spatial Distribution of Women by Population Group per Province, 2007 
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Figure 26 indicates that the provinces with the highest number of immigrants are Limpopo, Free 
State, and the Western Cape.  Limpopo is a border province with the countries of Botswana, Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique, and as such it should not be surprising to contain large numbers of immigrants there.  
Similarly, the Western Cape is a sought after destination for many migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and 
beyond.  Results from running the Hot Spot Analysis tool on the distribution of black women, marital 













   a) Province 
  b) Municipality 
Figure 25. Spatial Distribution of Singleness in South Africa, 2007. 
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          a) Province 
               b) Municipality 




a) Clustering of Black Women in South Africa 
 




c) Clustering of Immigrants in South Africa 
 
Figure 27. Hot Spot Analysis for Stealing Women Grievance per District Municipality , 2007 
There is significant clustering of high positive values (red) of black women in much of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Mpumalanga, Limpopo, and Gauteng provinces (Figure 27.a).  The eastern half of the Free State and 
North West, as well as the northeastern part of the Eastern Cape also contain significant clustering of 
high positive values.  There is significant clustering of high negative values (blue) in most of the Western 
Cape and the western half of the Northern Cape provinces.  There is no significant clustering (yellow) of 
black women represented in a band beginning in the eastern Northern Cape and western North West 
province, extending southeastward through the western Free State and finishing in the western Eastern 
Cape province.   
There is significant clustering of high positive values (red) for singleness in KwaZulu-Natal as well as 
the northeastern part of the Eastern Cape (Figure 27.b).  Significant clustering of high negative values 
(blue) again occurs in most of the Western Cape.  There is no significant clustering (yellow) of singleness 
across the rest of the country. 
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Significant clustering of high positive values (red) for the number of immigrants occurs in the 
northeastern most region of the Limpopo province (Figure 27.c).  There is also a significant clustering of 
high positive values around the city of Bloemfontein, in the Free State.  Significant high negative values 
(blue) occur in sporadic patches in the eastern Western Cape, northern Northern Cape, western North 
West province, southern Mpumalanga, and northwest Gauteng.  There is no significant clustering (yellow) 
for the presence of immigrants across the rest of the country. 
3. Spreading Disease 
The spreading disease grievance indicates that the highest reported rates of death due to disease 
occur in the easternmost half of the country (Figure 28).  Of the reported total causes of death in 2007, 
27.49% - 36.16% of the deaths were caused by disease in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga.  The Free 
State and Eastern Cape contained rates of 25.19% - 27.48%, whereas the Northern Cape and North 
West contained 18.94% - 25.18%.  Gauteng and the Western Cape contained rates of 18.19% - 18.93% 




Figure 28. Spatial Distribution of Spread of Disease Grievance by Province, 2007. 
4. Spread of Crime 
The spread of crime grievance was divided into five categories (Figure 29 a-e).  The total reported 
causes of death by assault (Figure 29.a) reveals that the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and Gauteng 
contained the highest reported rates (0.36% - 0.97%).  From highest to lowest, the crime by assault death 
was as follows: Western Cape (0.25% - 0.35%), Free State and North West (0.20% - 0.24%), Limpopo 
(0.15% - 0.19%), and the Northern Cape and Mpumalanga (0.11% - 0.14%).   
2.32% - 2.65% of individuals polled in the Western Cape, Free State, and Mpumalanga had been 
beaten up outside the home (Figure 29.b).  From highest to lowest, distribution of individuals polled who 
were beaten up outside the home was as follows: Gauteng (2.16% - 2.31%), Northern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal (1.70% - 2.15%), North West and Eastern Cape (0.97% - 1.69%), and Limpopo (0.96%).   
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11.85% - 15.59% of individuals polled in the Western Cape reported to have had possessions stolen 
in 2007 (Figure 29.c).  From highest to lowest, distribution of individuals polled who had things stolen was 
as follows: Gauteng, North West, KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape (8.83% - 11.84%), Free State and 
Mpumalanga (6.79% - 8.82%), Northern Cape (5.87% - 6.78%), and Limpopo (5.86%). 
4.68% - 5.08% of individuals polled in the Western Cape and Free State reported to have been 
harassed outside the household in 2007 (Figure 29.d).  From highest to lowest, the distribution of 
individuals polled who had been harassed outside the household was as follows: Northern Cape and 
Gauteng (3.91% - 4.67%), Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (3.34% - 3.90%), North West and 
Mpumalanga (2.12% - 3.33%), and Limpopo (2.11%). 
0.78% - 0.96% of individuals polled in the North West province reported to have been sexually 
assaulted outside the household in 2007 (29.e).  From highest to lowest, the distribution of individuals 
polled who had been sexually assaulted outside the household was as follows: Gauteng and the Eastern 
Cape (0.54% - 0.77%), the Free State, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu-Natal (0.23% - 0.53%), the Western 










        a) Assault 
        b) Beaten 
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           c) Theft                   




e) Sexually Assaulted 
Figure 29. Spatial Distribution of Spread of Crime Grievance by Province, 2007. 
5. Poor Service Delivery 
The poor service delivery grievance was represented by three categories (Figure 30.a-c).  17.74% -
29.19% of individuals polled in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal were without access to an electricity 
mains in the household (Figure 30.a).  From highest to lowest, the distribution of individuals polled without 
access to an electricity mains was as follows: Gauteng (14.43% - 17.73%), the North West and Limpopo 
(11.86% - 14.42%), the Northern Cape, Free State, and Mpumalanga (3.11% - 11.85%), and the Western 
Cape (3.10%).   
35.01% - 40.70% of individuals polled in KwaZulu-Natal were without access to piped water in 2007 
(Figure 30.b).  From highest to lowest, the distribution of individuals polled without access to piped water 
was as follows: the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga (28.39% - 35.00%), the Northern Cape, North West, 
and Limpopo (9.29% - 28.38%), the Free State (7.47% - 9.28%), and the Western Cape (6.58% - 7.46%). 
97.41% - 99.20% of individuals polled in Gauteng and the Western Cape were without access to land 
in 2007 (Figure 30.c).  From highest to lowest, the distribution of individuals polled without access to land 
76 
 
was as follows: the Northern Cape and Free State (95.92% - 97.40%), the North West and Mpumalanga 
(82.04% - 95.91%), Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal (60.18% - 82.03%), and the Eastern Cape (60.17%). 
 
a) No Electricity 
                  b) No Water 
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                c) No Land 
Figure 30. Spatial Distribution of Poor Delivery Grievance by Province, 2007. 
Opportunity Maps 
1. Youth Bulge 
The distribution of youth bulges across the country was represented at both spatial scales (Figure 
31.a-b).  The larger youth bulges were concentrated to the eastern half of the country.  KwaZulu-Natal 
and Limpopo provinces contained a youth bulge rate of 21.46% - 22.13% (Figure 31.a).  From highest to 
lowest the distribution of youth bulges across the country were as follows: the Eastern Cape and 
Mpumalanga (20.71% - 21.45%), the Free State (19.58% - 20.70%), the Western Cape, Northern Cape, 
and North West (17.96% - 19.57%), and Gauteng (17.95%).   
There is significant clustering of high positive values (red) of youth bulges in much of KwaZulu-Natal, 
northeastern Limpopo province, and northeastern Eastern Cape (Figure 32).  There is significant 
clustering of high negative values (blue) in the western half of the Western Cape as well as in the central 
and northeastern parts of the North West province, most of Gauteng province, as well as the northeastern 





           a) Province 
                b) Municipality 




Figure 32. Hot Spot Analysis of Youth Bulge by District Municipality, 2007. 
2. Poverty 
The poverty opportunity was represented by three categories (Figure 33.a-c).  7.30% - 8.46% of 
individuals polled in Gauteng and Limpopo provinces indicated that they had children living on the streets 
(Figure 33.a).  In descending order, the distribution of individuals polled who had children living on the 
streets was as follows: the Free State, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu-Natal (5.07% - 7.29%), the Northern 
Cape (4.14% - 5.06%), the North West and the Eastern Cape (2.27% - 4.16%), and the Western Cape 
(2.26%).     
42.15% - 50.10% of individuals polled in the Free State could not afford water in 2007 (Figure 33.b).  
In descending order, the distribution of individuals polled who could not afford water was as follows: 
Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape (26.42% - 42.14%), Gauteng and the Western Cape (16.04% - 
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26.41%), Limpopo, the North West, and KwaZulu-Natal (12.44% - 16.03%), and the Eastern Cape 
(12.43%).   
81.08% - 86.30% of individuals polled in Limpopo and the Eastern Cape were without access to a car 
in 2007 (Figure 33.c).  In descending order, the distribution of individuals polled without a car was as 
follows: KwaZulu-Natal (77.61% - 81.07%), the Northern Cape, the North West, the Free State, and 
Mpumalanga (66.63% - 77.60%), Gauteng (64.05% - 66.62%), and the Western Cape (64.04%).  
Modified Poverty Rate (MPR) 
Poverty was further analyzed by geospatially representing MPR by province and district municipality 
(Figure 34).  The Eastern Cape and Limpopo province contained the highest ratios of MPR across the 
study area.  The ratios of individuals living under the MPR across the rest of the country are as follows: 
68.81% - 75.82% of those living in the Eastern Cape and Limpopo province, 64.87% - 68.80% of those 
living in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal, 53.51% - 64.86% of those living in the Northern Cape, Free 
State, and North West, 49.36% - 53.50% of those living in Gauteng, and 49.35% of those living in the 
Western Cape.  There is significant clustering of high positive values (red) of MPR in KwaZulu-Natal, 
northeastern Limpopo province, and northeastern Eastern Cape (Figure 35).  There is significant 
clustering of high negative values (blue) in the western and southern halves of the Western Cape.  The 
remainder of the country experiences no significant clustering (yellow) of MPR.  
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a) Street Children 
b) Can‘t Afford Water                 
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c) Without a Car 





    a) Province 
b) District Municipality 




Figure 35. Hot Spot Analysis of MPR by District Municipality, 2007. 
Modeling Spatial Relationships 
Prior to running the OLS model, exploratory regression analysis was carried out on the explanatory 
variables (grievances and opportunities) in order to ensure that the most effective combination of 
variables was used to support the dependent variable in the OLS equation.  Exploratory Regression 
Analysis was carried out on six explanatory variables; four grievances (unemployment rates, distribution 
of black women, singleness, and distribution of foreigners) and two opportunities (MPR and youth bulge).  
The results of running Exploratory Regression Analysis revealed the summary of variable significance 
(Appendix A), possible variable redundancies (Appendix B), and the highest adjusted R-Squared results 
(Appendix C).   
The exploratory regression analysis indicates that unemployment rates (OLSFINAL.UNEMPL) are 
significant in explaining 93.55% of that variable towards the dependent variable.  The number of black 
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women (OLSFINAL.B_WOMEN) was significant in explaining 38.71% of that variable towards the 
dependent variable.  Singleness (OLSFINAL.SINGLENESS) was significant in explaining 54.84% of that 
variable towards the dependent variable.  The number of foreigners (OLS.FOREIGNERS) was significant 
in explaining only 29.03% of that variable towards the dependent variable.  Finally youth bulges 
(OLSFINAL.YOUTHBULGE) were significant in explaining 70.97% of that variable towards the dependent 
variable.  MPR (OLSFINAL.MPR) was significant in explaining only 25.81% of that variable towards the 
dependent variable.   
MPR was shown to cause the greatest variable redundancy with other covariates (93.75 with 
singleness, 93.75 with unemployment, 93.75 with youth bulge, 81.25 with distribution of black women, 
and 31.25 with distribution of foreigners).  Due to the poor performance by this variable in the tests of 
variable significance and variable redundancy, MPR was removed from the OLS equation.   
The statistic used to determine the effectiveness of the OLS tool is the adjusted R-Squared statistic.  
The highest adjusted R-Squared result from running the ERM was 0.68 (Appendix C).  The adjusted R-
Squared value is used to measure model performance and reflects model complexity (the number of 
variables) as it relates to the data, and consequently is a more accurate measure of model performance 
(cite). Possible values range from 0.0 to 1.0.  The adjusted R-Squared value of 0.68 indicates that this 
predictive model explains approximately 68% of the variation in the dependent variable, or 68% of the 
2008 xenophobic violence.  The set of explanatory variables that were associated with producing this high 
adjusted R-Squared result, in comparison to other combinations of variables that produced much lower 
adjusted R-Squared results, where chosen to serve as the independent variables in the regression 
equation.  Exploratory Regression Analysis eliminated the redundant variables, (MPR) and the 
distribution of black women, so that the OLS model could run as efficiently as possible.  Results of the 
analysis also revealed that the strongest combination of explanatory variables to measure variable 
significance to the location of the 2008 violence were: unemployment rates (OLSFINAL.UNEMPL), 
singleness, (OLSFINAL.SINGLENESS), distribution of foreigners (OLSFINAL.FOREIGNERS), and youth 




2008 Locations of Xenophobic Violence =  0 +  1(OLSFINAL.UNEMPL) +  2(OLSFINAL.SINGLENESS) 
+  3(OLSFINAL.FOREIGNERS) +  4(OLSFINAL.YOUTHBULGE) +   
Figure 36 illustrates the distribution of residuals across the study area.  Residuals are the 
unexplained portion of the dependent variable, represented in the regression equation as the random 
term error,   (ArcGIS Resource Center). 
 
Figure 36.  Map of OLS Residuals 
Using known values for the dependent variable (Y) and known values for all of the explanatory 
variables (the X‘s), the regression tool constructs an equation that will predict those known Y values as 
well as possible.  The difference between the observed Y values and the predicted Y values are known 
as the residuals.  The magnitude of the residuals from a regression equation is one measure of model fit.  
Large residuals indicate a poor fit. 
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In order to ensure that the residuals displayed in Figure 36 are random, and therefore not statistically 
significant or spatially correlated, the Spatial Autocorrelation (Morans I) tool was run.  The spatial 
autocorrelation report produced a z-score of 0.32, thereby indicating that the residuals produced from the 
OLS tool were indeed random and not statistically significant (Figure 37).  So, although there are 
over/under predictions represented as high z-scores (red) and low z-scores (blue), clustering of these 
over/under predictions are random.   
Appendix D and Appendix E reveal the results and diagnostics, respectively, of the OLS analysis.  
The coefficient for each explanatory variable reflects both the strength and type of relationship the 
explanatory variable has to the dependent variable.  The coefficient reflects the expected change in the 
dependent variable for every 1 unit change in the associated explanatory variable, holding all other 
variables constant.  The results are interpreted as follows: a 0.000035 increase in the number of 
xenophobic attacks is expected for each additional person unemployed (OLSFINAL.UNEMPL) across the 
study area, a 0.000021 increase in the number of xenophobic attacks is expected for each additional 
single person (OLSFINAL.SINGLENESS) across the study area, a 0.000169 decrease in the number of 
xenophobic attacks is expected for each additional foreigner (OLSFINAL.FOREIGNERS) across the study 
area, and a 0.000089 decrease in the number of xenophobic attacks is expected for each additional youth 
bulge increase (OLSFINAL.YOUTHBULGE) across the study area.  The OLS diagnostics report reveals 
that the Koenker (BP) Statistic is statistically significant (0.000064*).  Since this statistic is statistically 
significant, the robust probabilities are used to assess explanatory variable statistical significance.  An 
explanatory variable associated with a statistically significant coefficient is important to the regression 
model if causal theory supports a valid relationship with the dependent variable, which is true in this case.  
The Joint Wald Statistic is a measure of overall model statistical significance.  The null hypothesis for this 
test is that the explanatory variables in the model are not effective. For a 95% confidence level, a p-value 
(probability) smaller than 0.05 indicates a statistically significant model.  The associated p-value for the 
Joint Wald Statistic (0.000000*) is smaller than 0.05, and as such, indicates a statistically significant 
model.  This also reveals that the null hypothesis is incorrect, and that the explanatory variables in the 

















Correlation Analysis of Explanatory Variables 
 
Figure 38. Explanatory Variables Scatterplot Matrix 
Correlation analyses, and their associated graphics depicted in Figure 38 test the strength of the 
relationship between the explanatory variables.  The highlighted set of explanatory variables in Figure 38 
(Youth Bulge and MPR) indicates a very strong positive relationship between both variables.  In this case, 
the more individuals living under the modified poverty line, the greater the youth bulge.  It should be 
important to note that there is neither a positive or negative relationship between the 2008 xenophobic 
events (Events) and any of the six explanatory variables.  Similarly, when Foreigners is used as part of a 
90 
 
correlation analysis, the resulting relationship is neither positive nor negative.  All other variables, 





























The data derived and discussed from the methodology and results sections of this study indicate that 
it is possible to geospatially represent grievances and opportunities which lead to xenophobic violence in 
South Africa.  This study builds on previous research by targeting the importance of grievance and 
opportunity as contributory motives towards xenophobic violence.  The following discussion section 
explains how the analytical processes carried out in this study are effective in measuring the propensity 
for xenophobic violence in South Africa. 
By obtaining census data representative of group grievance and group opportunity, it was possible to 
identify the spatial distribution of each across the study area, represented in each case by quantitative 
thematic maps.  The creation of the grievance and opportunity maps served as the first level of analysis 
of the geographic phenomenon that is xenophobic violence.  This first level of analysis began to answer 
the question of ―where‖ grievances and opportunities are distributed across the study area.  Grievance 
and opportunity magnitude were also addressed through the analysis. 
After each grievance and opportunity was cartographically represented, the second level of analysis 
could be carried out through assessing the degree of significant statistical relationship between EA units 
representing each grievance and opportunity.  This level of analysis answered the question of ―where‖ 
spatial patterns are distributed across the study area.  The ESRI Hot Spot Analysis (Getis-Ord Gi*) Model 
identified the geographic locations that contained the highest and lowest degree of clustering.     
The first two levels of analysis identified the intensity of distribution of the grievances and 
opportunities as well as the distance relationships between the grievances and opportunities.  These two 
levels of analysis addressed ―where‖ the data was spatially located across the study area.  The next 
logical question involves the ―why‖.  Using regression analysis, the spatial relationships represented 
during the first two levels of analysis were modeled to create a regression equation revealing the degree 
to which the hypothesis of this study is correct.  The utilization of regression analysis helped explain the 
inherent factors behind the observed spatial patterns identified during the first two levels of analysis.  
Modeling spatial relationships allows the regression analysis to be useful in model prediction.   
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Regression analysis was chosen as the final level of statistical analysis for two primary reasons.  The 
first reason was the ability to model a geographic phenomenon (xenophobic violence), and to better 
understand it and possibly use that understanding to effect policy or make decisions about appropriate 
actions to take.  The basic objective here was to measure the extent that changes in one or more 
variables jointly affect changes in another.  The second reason was the ability regression analysis 
possesses in analyzing and exploring a hypothesis.  Utilization of a regression equation in this case 
tested the strength of the explanatory variables to best predict the dependent variable modeled; the 
dependent variable being the locations of the xenophobic violence of 2008 and the explanatory variables 
being grievances and opportunities.  The analysis revealed which explanatory variables were the 
strongest and weakest variables in explaining the 2008 xenophobic violence. 
For an OLS model to perform successfully, an adjusted R-Squared result of at least 0.80 is expected 
(ArcGIS Resource Center).  The overall adjusted R-Squared result of this OLS model was only 0.68.  The 
OLS map indicated that there were clustering (high and low) of residuals across the study area.  The 
variance inflation factor (VIF) measures redundancy among explanatory variables.  Explanatory variables 
with VIF values larger than 7.5 indicate that two more of the variables are telling the same story and 
should be removed from the regression model (ArcGIS Resource Center).  The VIF for three of the four 
variables used in the regression equation were much larger than 7.5 (Appendix C).  Results of the OLS 
diagnostic (Appendix E) revealed a significant Jarque-Bera p-value statistic.  This indicates that the OLS 
residuals were not normally distributed and a key variable is likely missing.  In order to identify the cause 
of these statistical phenomena, a scatterplot matrix of the OLS residuals was created (Figure 38).  The 
scatterplot matrix revealed that most of the variables shared a positive relationship with one another.  
However, the matrix also revealed that none of the variables held any type of correlation relationship 
(positive or negative) with the 2008 event locations (Events).  Similarly, none of the variables held any 
type of correlation relationship (positive or negative) with the number of foreigners (Foreigners) 
explanatory variable.  This indicates that individual explanatory variables alone are insufficient in 
explaining the 2008 event locations.  There must be a combination of explanatory variables present. 
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Appendix D reveals the coefficient strengths of the explanatory variables used in the OLS model.  
Results of the OLS model indicate that a 0.000035 increase in the number of xenophobic attacks is 
expected for each additional person unemployed (OLSFINAL.UNEMPL) across the study area.  The 
dependent variable represents one unit.  Therefore, to determine the number of unemployed persons 
needed to represent an additional xenophobic event, the dependent variable can be divided by the 
coefficient.  This calculation can be repeated for each of the other explanatory variables to determine the 
actual number of additional persons per each explanatory variable needed to positively or negatively 
influence the number of xenophobic events.  For the distribution of unemployed persons 
(OLSFINAL.UNEMPL), the number of additional unemployed persons required to represent an additional 
xenophobic event are: 1/0.000035 = 28,571.  Similarly for the distribution of singleness 
(OLSFINAL.SINGLENESS), the number of additional single persons required to represent an additional 
xenophobic event are: 1/ 0.000021 = 47,619.  Conversely, an additional number of foreigners 
(OLSFINAL.FOREIGNERS) of 1/0.000169 = 5,917, is required to decrease the number of xenophobic 
events by one across the study area whereas an additional number of youth representing youth bulges 
(OLSFINAL.YOUTHBULGE) of, 1/0.000089 = 11,235, is required to decrease the number of xenophobic 














VII.  CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS 
There will continue to be a need to constantly readdress high risk xenophobic violence monitoring 
across urban centers of the country due to the facts that the coalitions that were formed in response to 
the violence of 2008 have faltered and various organizations have since retreated back to working on 
their core business without reflecting on how to integrate the issues facing refugees and migrants into 
their programs and goals.  Few, if any, non-refugee organizations have subsequently formally integrated 
xenophobia, migrants and refugees into their day-to-day work. (Parsley, 2010).  Before summarizing the 
successes of this research, one must note specific data limitations within this study. 
Data Limitations 
There were limitations in the census datasets used to represent group grievances and opportunities.  
First of all, CS 2007 cannot act as a replacement for the Census.  Attempts were made by STATSSA to 
adjust measurements to a best estimate, but these attempts resulted in some error.  Most of the 
adjustments made by STATSSA could not produce usable estimates of counts in some municipalities 
(Community Survey Basic Results).  The exception of better estimates was observed in densely 
populated municipalities like metro areas.  Measurements in terms of proportion is much less susceptible 
to random error than counts (numbers), and as a consequence, CS 2007 gives useful information for 
estimating proportions, averages or ratios for smaller area domains (Community Survey Basic Results).  
Using CS 2007, reliance should be minimalized on using numbers for variables broken down at 
geographical hierarchy Level 3 (population, age, group, etc…).  However, the aggregated total number 
per municipality provides more reliable estimates (Census 2007 Basic Results).  In order to work around 
this data limitation, datasets used to produce the group grievances and opportunities maps were all 
normalized to produce percentages or rates, thus ensuring that proportions were used over counts at a 
scale of Level 3. 
Reliable datasets on numbers representing internal migrants within South Africa are contentiously 
debatable.  Therefore, one of the datasets constituting the ―Stealing Women‖ grievance (number of 
foreigners living in the country in 2007), should be viewed as representing a very general distribution of 
the true numbers and clusters of foreigners residing in the country.  Until more accurate and reliable 
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methodologies are developed to monitor the number of migrants dwelling within the country at any given 
time, this grievance will continue to prove difficult to fully represent. 
Significance of Findings 
Past research reveals that a positive relationship does exist between group grievances and 
opportunities with civil conflict.  This research successfully demonstrates that census data is a viable 
source of data to represent group grievances and opportunities for conflict.  Furthermore, this research 
reveals that it is possible to cartographically represent those grievances and opportunities, and that once 
mapped, the degree to which grievances and opportunities influence events of xenophobic violence can 
be analyzed.  Once mapped and analyzed, comparison can then take place with known events. 
The significance of this research rests in the ability to use grievances and opportunities as inputs in a 
predictive model to measure the coefficient strength of explanatory variables of a significant xenophobic 
event.  This research proves that not only is it possible to map census data to represent group grievance 
and opportunity, but that it is a worthwhile foundation upon which conflict prediction models should be 
built.  The overarching goal of this research was to geospatially represent the distribution of the causes of 
the 2008 xenophobic violence, and to identify the legitimacy of the grievances South African nationals 
have voiced in response to African non-nationals entering their country.  This research was successful in 
acquiring datasets representative of group grievances and opportunities.  Once the datasets were 
acquired, this study proved successful in answering where each grievance and opportunity was 
distributed across the study area.  The study was successful in creating a predictive conflict model that 
identified two grievances with positive correlations with xenophobic events; unemployment and 
singleness.   
This study contributes to the global research community in two ways.  The first is to global conflict 
studies.  Group grievances and opportunities are associated with conflict events.  Applying geostatistical 
analyses to these factors allows researchers to understand where, how, and why group grievances and 
opportunities influence significant conflict events.  The second is in part to the extensive research that has 
been carried out in analyzing the xenophobic violence of 2008 in South Africa, and in part to the 
continued research taking place within the country to continuously map and monitor the xenophobic 
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landscape across South Africa with the sole goal to predict where and when future xenophobic events 
might occur.       
Future Research 
From October 10 – 31 of 2011, the third major census in South Africa was carried out since the 
advent of democracy (cite).  With the release of the census data to occur at the end of 2012, accurate, 
up-to-date census data will be available representing the various group grievances and opportunities 
highlighted in this study.  It would be imperative to deploy the predictive model used in this study to 
identify the geospatial distribution of group grievances and opportunities in South Africa in order to gain 
an accurate picture of how the xenophobic landscape appears today.   
This research exposed the need to redefine instances of xenophobic violence.  Employing the 
predictive model used in this study with a deployment of a continuously monitoring crisis mapping system 
would allow for more thorough day-to-day monitoring of group grievances and opportunities.  The conflict 
monitoring system could be delivered through an open/crowd source platform, such as Ushahidi, that 
would serve to continuously monitor high risk conflict zones across the country.   
Researchers indicate that it‘s not a matter of ―if‖ but ―when‖ an event similar to the outburst of 
xenophobic violence of 2008 will reoccur.  May a lack of preparedness not find itself on the list of 
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